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Abstract
This thesis examines the domestic and international transmission of fiscal shocks, especially
in the wake of the European sovereign debt crisis after the Great Recession. The thesis is
divided into three main chapters, with each chapter addressing contemporary policy questions
in recent macroeconomic debates. The first chapter investigates the effect of fiscal consolidation
on different types of household, and how the degree of household’s financial constraints interacts
with the government’s debt-consolidation plan in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model estimated on UK data. In the second chapter, the analysis is extended to a
two-country model in order to investigate the international transmission of fiscal shocks between
the UK and the Euro area, and how the relative participation of these countries at the global
asset market influence cross-border fiscal spillovers. Motivated by the recent calls on German
government to increase its spending, the third chapter estimates the international spillover
effects of an expansion in German government spending on output and bilateral exchange rates
of 15 European (10 Euro and 5 non-Euro) economies within a sign-restricted structural VAR
model.
Evidence from the closed-economy model shows that different types of households respond dif-
ferently to fiscal consolidation shocks, depending on the degree of financial constraints they
face. Tighter household’s credit constraints dampen the responsiveness of fiscal instruments to
government debt, thereby prolonging the actualisation of the consolidation plan. On the inter-
national transmission of fiscal shock, the results show that EA fiscal shocks have sizeable effects
on the UK economy, while UK fiscal shocks have negligible effects on the EA economy. Also,
relative countries’ participation at the international asset market drives the amplification and
propagation of cross-border fiscal spillovers. Furthermore, German government spending shock
has moderate but short-lived effects on output of other European countries, with homogeneous
responses in the Euro countries, but heterogeneous responses in non-Euro countries.
Key words : Fiscal Policy; Financial Constraints; Rule-of-thumb Consumers; Cross-border
Spillovers; Open Economy Macroeconomic Model; Bayesian Estimation; Structural VARs; Sign
Restrictions.
JEL classification: E62, F41, F42, H31, H63.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Fiscal Policy in the Last
Decade
In the last decade, fiscal policy has gained traction in macroeconomic discourse. A number
of studies have been devoted to the analysis of fiscal policy in academic literature. For in-
stance, several studies, including Mountford & Uhlig (2009) and Barro & Redlick (2011), have
attempted to estimate the macroeconomic effects of government spending and taxes. Most
studies find sizeable fiscal multipliers, though some other studies, such as Cogan et al. (2010),
find much smaller multipliers. Auerbach & Gorodnichenko (2012), Candelon & Lieb (2013)
and Ramey & Zubairy (2018) further find that these fiscal multipliers vary over the business
cycle: they are relatively larger during the recession than in expansion. Leeper et al. (2017)
also find that fiscal multipliers vary over the policy regimes: they are much larger under ac-
tive fiscal/passive monetary regime than under active monetary/passive fiscal regime at long
horizons.
Regarding the influence of macroeconomic conditions on fiscal transmission, Christiano et al.
(2011) and Correia et al. (2013) show that fiscal multipliers are often larger and in excess of
one when interest rate is constrained to the effective lower bound. Also, Gal´ı et al. (2007) and
Eggertsson & Krugman (2012) find that controlling for financial constraints among households
has important implications for the transmission of fiscal policy: it is a mechanism through
which an expansion in government spending leads to an increase in private consumption. On
the timing of impact, Ramey (2011b), Leeper et al. (2012) and Leeper et al. (2013) show that
private agents often anticipate the effect of fiscal policy well ahead of the time of impact due
to legislative and implementation lags. Corsetti et al. (2010, 2012) further show that the antic-
ipation of government spending reversal could alter the conventional responses of interest rate
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and exchange rate to fiscal policy shocks. Other studies, such as Auerbach & Gorodnichenko
(2013) and Corsetti & Mu¨ller (2014), find that domestic fiscal policy have sizeable international
spillover effects on foreign economies, and these effects are much larger when both the source
and the recipient economies are in recession. While some other studies, such as Erceg & Linde´
(2013) and Alesina, Favero & Giavazzi (2015), further debate the associated cost in output
terms of implementing specific tax- and spending-based fiscal policy.
This thesis examines the domestic and international transmission of fiscal policy, especially
as tools for debt consolidation after the Great Recession. The thesis is divided into three
different but related chapters, with each chapter addressing policy-relevant questions in con-
temporary macroeconomic debates. The analysis is conducted within both theoretical business
cycle models and empirical structural vector autoregressive models (SVAR).
Chapter 2 examines the heterogeneous effect of fiscal consolidation on different types of
households, and the implications of household’s financial constraints for the achievement of debt
consolidation in the United Kingdom. This chapter is motivated by the recent implementation
of consolidation measures in many European economies aimed at stemming the growth of
public debt, which surge to record levels as a result of various fiscal stimulus packages to bail-
out private businesses during the financial crisis. The consolidation policy generates significant
debates in both academic and policy circles, but little consideration is given to the degree of
financial constraints among households. The chapter addresses the following research questions:
what are the effects of fiscal consolidation on different types of household? And, how do
household’s financial constraints influence the government’s consolidation policy?
To address these questions, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is de-
veloped and estimated on UK data for the period 1987:Q1 – 2010:Q2. Building on Leeper,
Plante & Traum (2010), the model incorporates a fraction of households that are financially
constrained and exhibits rule-of-thumb behaviours, and a rich fiscal sector that allows govern-
ment services to have direct effects on household preferences, while government transfers have
distortionary effects. Evidence from the results show that different types of households respond
differently to fiscal consolidation shocks, depending on the degree of financial constraints they
face. Irrespective of the choice of consolidation strategy, the financially constrained households
consume less while working more, compared to the unconstrained households. Also, the degree
of household’s financial constraints has important implication for debt consolidation. More
precisely, the responsiveness of fiscal instruments to government debt becomes weaker as the
degree of household’s financial constraints intensifies, thereby prolonging the achievement of
the government’s consolidation targets. Furthermore, responses of macroeconomic variables
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are sensitive to the choice of fiscal strategy while responding to consolidation shocks, and these
have important implications for the achievement of the debt consolidation plan. The chap-
ter concludes that the government should selectively implement fiscal consolidation policies in
order to minimise output loss.
In Chapter 3, the analysis is extended to a two-country business cycle model in order to
investigate the international transmission of fiscal policy shocks between the Euro Area (EA)
and the United Kingdom (UK). The chapter also investigates the role of credit-constraints on
cross-border fiscal spillovers. While several studies have been devoted to the analysis of inter-
national fiscal spillovers and multipliers, this paper is among the few to analyse the implication
of EA fiscal policy for the UK economy. The paper is also one of the first to formally derive and
analyse the effect of countries’ international financial exposure on cross-border transmission of
fiscal policy. The model follow closely that of Corsetti et al. (2010, 2012), but abstracts from
nominal rigidities for simplicity and tractability. As a contribution, the model is enriched to
reflect variation in responses of different types of household to fiscal adjustments by allowing
different valuation of government services in household’s effective consumption bundles. The
model is estimated on time series data for the UK and EA using Bayesian methods.
The results of the analysis show that EA fiscal shocks have sizeable effects on UK economic
activities, while UK fiscal shocks have negligible effects on EA economy. This result is driven
mainly by the strong trade links between UK and the EA – nearly half of the total UK trade
is with the EA, and the relatively small size of the UK economy. Also, the size of cross-border
spillover effects varies considerably, depending on the choice of fiscal instruments. While the
spending-based fiscal spillovers have strong procyclical effects, the tax-based spillover effects are
relatively small and sometimes countercyclical. Furthermore, the relative degree of household’s
credit-constraints in the source country of the shock drives the propagation and amplification of
cross-border fiscal spillovers through its effect on the net asset position. Asset holders respond
much earlier to changes in relative participation at the global asset market by adjusting their
portfolios accordingly within the first year. Whereas, non-asset holders mainly respond to this
change in the medium-run. The chapter concludes that fiscal authorities should coordinate
their policies in order to reduce uncertainties associated with cross-border policy spillovers.
Chapter 4 empirically investigates the international transmission of fiscal policy in Europe.
This chapter is motivated by the recent calls by major international policy institutions – such
as the International Monetary Fund and the European Union – for German government to
increase its spending in order to boost economic activities in the rest of the Euro countries.
The proponents of this call maintain that an expansion in German fiscal spending would boost
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domestic demand and stimulate output and inflation in the rest of the Euro Area. In contrast,
the German government argues that such fiscal expansion would have relatively small spillover
effects on other European economies due to the low import content of German public expendi-
ture. This paper contributes to this debate by addressing the questions: what are the effects of
government spending on demand for foreign goods? Does an increase in government spending
leads to output expansion in foreign economies? And, is there heterogeneity in the responses
of foreign countries to domestic fiscal shocks?
To address these questions, the paper follows the approach of Corsetti & Mu¨ller (2014) by
estimating an open-economy fiscal VAR model for Germany and then extend the VAR model
to include foreign output and exchange rates in order to analyse cross-border spillover effects of
German government spending shock. The novelty of this paper is in both the methodology and
scope. While existing similar studies in the literature are based on zero-restriction identification,
this paper identifies the government spending shock using Uhlig (2005)’s agnostic identification
method which imposes sign restrictions on the impulse response functions. Also, this paper
estimates country-specific spillover effects of German government spending shock on fifteen
European (ten Euro and five non-Euro) countries. These include all the 14 countries in the
panel analysis of Beetsma & Giuliodori (2011) as well as Norway and Switzerland. Furthermore,
unlike most recent empirical studies, this analysis incorporates the period after the financial
crisis when fiscal policy is relatively active.
Evidence from the VAR estimation shows that a bond-financed expansion in German gov-
ernment spending depreciates the German real exchange rate and the terms of trade, and
worsen the German trade balance position. The deterioration of the trade balance is driven by
an increase in domestic demand for foreign goods, suggesting some output spillovers to foreign
economies. Regarding the spillover effects, German government spending has moderate but
short-lived effects on rest-of-Europe output. On impact, the cross-border output spillover is
positive in non-GIIPS Euro countries, zero or negative in the GIIPS countries and has mixed
effects in non-Euro countries. In the medium run, German spending spillover has no positive
effect on rest-of-Europe output. The effects of German fiscal shock on bilateral real exchange
rates are relatively larger and heterogeneous across non-Euro countries, but smaller and ho-
mogeneous for the Euro countries. In the non-GIIPS Euro countries, bilateral real exchange
rate appreciates in the short run and depreciates in the medium run, while it depreciates with
lags in the GIIPS countries. Whereas, for non-Euro countries, bilateral real exchange rates
of the Scandinavian countries appreciate for an extended period and then return to preshock
levels; while for UK and Switzerland, bilateral real exchange rates do not respond significantly
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to German spending shock. The chapter concludes that, while German government spending
could lead to output expansion in Euro countries, low trade intensity and internal dynamics of
some countries —such as high sovereign debt risks in the GIIPS countries— may inhibit gains
from international fiscal spillovers.
Chapter 5 summarises the key findings of the thesis, discusses some limitations of the
research, and suggests some possible extensions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Fiscal Consolidation and Financial
Constraints: An Estimated DSGE
Model of the UK Economy
“The budget deficit is forecast to fall to 3.7% this year, which is less than half the 10% we inherited
in 2010. But all that progress is at risk if we do not finish the job. While we move from deficit to
surplus, this Charter commits us to keeping debt falling as a share of GDP each and every year.
Only when... we have GDP growth of less than 1% a year... will that surplus no longer be required.
[We] are continuing to devote a greater share of state support to the most vulnerable. [Those] with
broadest shoulders are bearing the greatest burden. For we are all in this together.”
- George Osborne, 2015 Summer Budget Speech.
2.1 Introduction
Following the recent global financial crisis, public debt in many developed economies surge
to record levels as the government stimulates the economy with direct bail-outs of private
businesses while tax revenue falls. Between 2007 and 2009, public debt rose by about 75% in
many developed countries with systemic financial risks – such as the United States, United
Kingdom, Spain, Ireland and Iceland – and by about 20% in real terms for countries with
less financial risks (Reinhart & Rogoff 2010). After the crisis, several European governments
initiated various consolidation measures aimed at reducing public debt levels and stabilising
growth.1 In the UK, the government has implemented various consolidation measures since
1For instance, for each successive fiscal year between 2008 and 2015, the Irish government implemented
specific consolidation measures, including pay cut for young people (ages 20-24 years), reduction in national
minimum wage, increase in personal tax and a significant cut in social security payment. In Greece, the situation
is similar with the addition of an increase in value-added tax (VAT) on consumption goods and a cut in the
minimum wage.
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Figure 2.1: Time series plot of UK government debt-to-GDP and UK real GDP.
Source: Eurostat and World Bank database
2010, including cuts in social benefit pay-outs, abolishment of housing benefits for young people
(18-20 years old), limited tax credits, public wage freezes, and commercialisation of public
enterprises among others. Despite these consolidation measures, public debt remains high and
growth has not returned to its pre-crisis trend level (see Figure 2.1). Yet, the government
consistently maintains that the consolidation policy is appropriate for the economy and its
effect would spread to all households alike, with little consideration for the degree of financial
constraints faced by some households.
However, a new set of literature has shown that fiscal consolidation can be self-defeating,
especially in a depressed economy with excess capacity and when short-term interest rates
are constrained to effective lower bounds (DeLong & Summers 2012, Holland & Portes 2012,
Attinasi & Metelli 2017, Bandeira et al. 2018). More precisely, Jorda` & Taylor (2016) show
that a fiscal consolidation of 1% of GDP leads to an output loss of 3.5% over a five-year period
when implemented in a slump, compared to 1.8% in a boom. In another more recent study,
Barnichon & Matthes (2018) find that, irrespective of the identification strategy employed,
fiscal contraction multiplier is larger than 1, and even much larger during recession; whereas,
fiscal expansion multiplier is substantially less than 1 regardless of the state of the economy.
Also, as Cwik & Wieland (2011) and Eggertsson & Krugman (2012) note, the effect of the re-
cent financial crisis —which preceded the current debt crisis— can cause more household agents
to become financially constrained and live from “hand to mouth”.2 Thus, in this scenario, fiscal
consolidation is likely to further depress the economy as higher proportion of financially con-
2Studies by Campbell & Mankiw (1989, 1990, 1991), Kaplan & Violante (2014) and Kaplan et al. (2014) use
macro and micro dataset to prove the existence of this group of household. Their findings suggest an estimate
of the proportion of hand-to-mouth household to be about 25-50%.
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strained household would lead to loss of tax revenue and increase pressure on welfare spending,
which in turn would necessitate more public borrowing and further worsen the debt crisis. Un-
like the less financially constrained “wealthy” households who smooth consumption based on
their permanent income, the financially constrained “hand-to-mouth” households exhibit rule-
of-thumb behaviours by consuming their current income. This intrinsic heterogeneity among
households has been documented to influence household responses to fiscal shocks and alter the
macroeconomic effect of fiscal policy (for instance, see Gal´ı et al. (2007), Drautzburg & Uhlig
(2015)).
In this paper, we analyse the heterogeneous effects of fiscal consolidation on different types
of households. We also examine the implication of household’s financial constraints for the
achievement of government’s consolidation plan. Specifically, the paper addresses the following
policy questions: What are the effects of fiscal consolidation on different types of households?
How do household’s financial constraints influence the government’s consolidation policy? To
address these questions, we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model and esti-
mate it on UK data using Bayesian methods. We enrich the model of Leeper, Plante & Traum
(2010) in three ways: First, we incorporate rule-of-thumb behaviours in order to capture the
degree of financial constraints faced by some households, as in Gal´ı et al. (2007) and Bilbiie
(2008); second, we incorporate a fiscal sector that allows government consumption to have direct
effect on households’ preferences and allows government transfer to have distortionary effects,
as in Coenen et al. (2013); and finally, following Kliem & Kriwoluzky (2014), we modify the
fiscal rule by allowing distortionary taxes on capital and labour to respond to the investment
component of the business cycle. These features are central to our analysis as we intend to take
the model to the data.
This paper makes two key contributions. First, we are some of the first to analyse the effect
of fiscal policy in an estimated DSGE model with heterogeneous households for the UK economy.
We estimate the model on nine quarterly UK time series for the period 1987:Q1 – 2010:Q2. A
similar study by Bhattarai & Trzeciakiewicz (2017) mainly quantifies the GDP multiplier of
UK fiscal policy. This paper moves a step further to analyse the implications of household’s
financial constraints for UK fiscal policy and demonstrate its importance in achieving debt
consolidation. Second, we analyse the heterogeneous responses of different types of households
to fiscal policy shocks. Most studies with heterogeneous households rarely analyse household-
specific responses to policy shocks. However, as Aiyagari (1994) notes, agent-specific responses
differ considerably from aggregate responses, and this distinction is not just driven by differences
in wealth endowment, but also by the intrinsic nature of different types of households. While
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few studies, such as Coenen & Straub (2005) and Bhattarai & Trzeciakiewicz (2017), analyse the
differences in consumption response of different types of households, McManus (2015) further
analyses the differences in employment response, but in a calibrated model. In this paper,
we analyse the estimated responses of both aggregate and household-specific consumption and
labour efforts to fiscal consolidation shocks.
The results of our analysis are in threefold. First, we find that households differ consider-
ably in their responses to fiscal shocks, depending on the degree of financial constraints they
face. Irrespective of the fiscal strategy adopted, fiscal consolidation causes the consumption
of financially constrained households to fall more, which then forces them to work more, com-
pared to unconstrained households. Secondly, our analysis shows that the degree of household’s
financial constraints influences the responsiveness of fiscal instruments to debt innovations. As
the proportion of financially constrained households increases, fiscal adjustments to government
debt becomes weaker. The implication of this result is that the achievement of government con-
solidation targets becomes prolonged with more financially constrained households. Thirdly,
simulations based on the estimated parameters show that the responses of macroeconomic
variables to consolidation shocks are sensitive to the choice of fiscal instruments inducing the
debt innovations. Also, spending-based consolidation leads to smaller output contraction in
the medium run compared to tax-based consolidation. Furthermore, consolidation targets are
likely to be achieved in more reasonable time under a mix-instrument strategy, compared to
when each fiscal instrument independently responds to debt. Additional analyses conducted to
check the sensitivity of the estimated results to alternative specifications and sample periods
show that the results are robust.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2.2, we discuss the theoretical model
for our analysis. Section 2.3 describes the data and estimation procedure, the calibration of
selected parameters, and the prior assigned to estimated parameters. In section 2.4, we report
the results of the estimated model, analyse the impulse responses and conduct several sensitivity
analyses. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
Our baseline model is adapted to the works of Leeper, Plante & Traum (2010) and Leeper,
Walker & Yang (2010). Both studies are based on real business cycle models with represen-
tative agents, representative firms and the government; and they include real frictions such as
investment adjustment costs, variable capacity utilisation and external habit in consumption.
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In addition to four structural shocks (preference shocks, labour supply shock, technology shock,
investment-specific technology shock), Leeper, Plante & Traum (2010) also include five fiscal
shocks while Leeper, Walker & Yang (2010) incorporate six fiscal shocks. Specifically, we en-
rich the model of Leeper, Plante & Traum (2010) in three ways. First, following Gal´ı et al.
(2007) and Bilbiie (2008), we incorporate rule-of-thumb behaviours into the model to capture
the degree of financial constraints among households. Second, we control for the direct effect
of public services on households’ effective consumption by including government consumption
services in the utility preference in a non-linear form, as in Coenen et al. (2013) and Ercolani
& e Azevedo (2014). Third, to properly identify the fiscal parameters, we follow the path of
Kliem & Kriwoluzky (2014) by modifying the fiscal rules to allow distortionary taxes on capital
and labour income to respond only to the investment component of the business cycle.
2.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households, indexed with i ∈ [0, 1], which comprises two groups: (i)
Ricardian (also referred to as forward-looking or financially unconstrained) households, indexed
with r ∈ [λ, 1], have access to the financial market and accumulate physical and financial assets.
As a result, this class of households can smooth consumption across time —intertemporal
optimisation— in response to structural shocks. (ii) Non-Ricardian (also referred to as the rule-
of-thumb, hand-to-mouth or financially constrained) households, indexed with h ∈ [0, λ], are
liquidity constrained and do not own any physical or financial assets. As a result of their limited
asset market participation, rule-of-thumb households do not smooth consumption across time;
rather, they simply consume their current labour income in each period —that is, intratemporal
optimisation (Bilbiie 2008, Kollmann 2012).
Following Bouakez & Rebei (2007), Pappa (2009), Coenen et al. (2013), Ercolani & e Azevedo
(2014) and Pappa et al. (2015), the effective consumption of household-i is specified as a non-
separable constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator of the household’s own-private
consumption and government consumption services:
C˜it =
[
(1− %) 1ϕCit
ϕ−1
ϕ + %
1
ϕGt
ϕ−1
ϕ
] ϕ
ϕ−1
, i ∈ (r, h) (2.1)
where Cit and Gt are the household-specific private consumption and government consumption
services respectively, % ∈ (0, 1) is the share of government consumption in the effective con-
sumption aggregator, and ϕ ∈ (0,∞) is the CES substitution elasticity between private and
public consumption goods. As ϕ→ 0, private and public consumption tend to become perfect
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complements, while they tend towards perfect substitutes as ϕ → ∞. A Cobb-Douglas case
is obtained as ϕ → 1. While some studies, such as Papageorgiou (2012) and Natvik (2009),
assume separability of private and government consumption in the utility, this paper adopts
non-separability to ensure that government consumption directly affects private consumption
decisions, thereby leading to co-movement of both.3
Households derive utility from their effective consumption, C˜it , and disutility from labour
effort, N it , in each quarter.
4 It is also assumed that each type of households internalises their
consumption habit which is proxied by the past level of consumption, C˜it−1. Formally, house-
holds maximise a lifetime expected utility function given by:
Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtεut
[
(C˜it − κC˜it−1)1−σ
1− σ − ε
n
t
N it
1+ 1
η
1 + 1
η
]}
(2.2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, σ is the consumption rate of risk aversion
(CRRA) and the inverse of intertemporal substitution elasticity, and η is the Frisch labour
supply elasticity. κ ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of habit formation in effective consumption.5 εut
and εnt are the preference shocks to the subjective discount factor and labour supply respectively.
Both shocks follow AR(1) processes given by:
ln(εjt) = ρj ln(ε
j
t−1) + 
j
t , 
j
t ∼ NIID(0, σj), for j ∈ (u, n) (2.3)
where jt are pure random errors to the preference shocks.
Ricardian Households
Ricardian households maximize utility subject to a flow budget constraint given by:
(1 + τ ct )C
r
t + I
r
t +
Brt+1
Rt
= (1− τwt )WtN rt + [rkt − τ kt (rkt − δ)]Krt + Πrt +Brt + Zrt , (2.4)
3For instance, government consumption spending on primary healthcare and basic education directly impacts
on private consumption decisions.
4While Gal´ı et al. (2004, 2007) adopt non-separable preferences in their models, this paper adopts separability
in consumption and hours in order to track their unique responses to structural shocks while fully taking into
account any wealth effect.
5Di Bartolomeo et al. (2011) assume that rule-of-thumb households can not engage in habitual consumption
smoothing since they only consume their current income in each period. By implication, this assumption rules
out steady state equality of consumption between the two groups of households since the Ricardian marginal
utility of consumption is now discounted by the smoothing factor. This is a clear departure from most studies
involving non-Ricardian households, such as Gal´ı et al. (2004, 2007), Coenen et al. (2013), Cogan et al. (2013)
and Rossi (2014).
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and a capital law of motion, in the style of Christiano et al. (2005), given by:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + ItεIt
[
1− φ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2]
. (2.5)
In each period, Ricardian households supply labour, N rt , to the firm in return for a real wage,
Wt. They consume C
r
t unit of private goods, accumulate capital investment, I
r
t , and rent capital
goods, Krt , to the firm at a real cost, r
k
t . They also receive profit, Π
r
t , from the ownership of the
firm. They hold a one-period riskless government bond, Brt+1, which is purchased at time t for
a gross real return, Rt, at period t+ 1, and also receive transfer, Z
r
t , from the government. In
return, the households pay taxes to the government, with τ ct , τ
w
t and τ
k
t being the distortionary
taxes on consumption, labour income and capital income respectively. φ is the adjustment
cost parameter and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. The capital adjustment costs, φ(.),
determine the degree to which costly investment spending affects changes in capital stock. At
steady state, the function φ(.) has the property: φ(1) = 0, φ′(1) = 0, and φ′′(1) > 0. εIt is the
investment-specific technology shock which follows an AR(1) process, such that:
ln(εIt ) = ρI ln(ε
I
t−1) + 
I
t , 
I
t ∼ NIID(0, σI). (2.6)
Hand-to-mouth Households
The hand-to-mouth (HtM) household maximises a single-period utility function subject to the
following budget constraint:
(1 + τ ct )C
h
t = (1− τwt )WtNht + Zht (2.7)
In each period, they consume their labour income, WtN
h
t , which is augmented with lump-
sum government transfers, Zht , as a form of social insurance. HtM households also pay taxes
on consumption and labour income, but they do not pay capital taxes since, by construction,
they do not own any physical or financial asset.
2.2.2 Firms
Firms operate in a competitive market with the aim of maximizing profits given by
Πt = Yt −WtNt − rktKt. (2.8)
At the beginning of each period, firms employ labour, Nt, from both types of households,
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paying a universal wage, Wt, since there is no discrimination in the labour market. They
also rent capital, Kt, from the Ricardian household at a rental cost, r
k
t . Following Cantore
& Levine (2012), we assume that the firms apply a CES technology to the combination of
inputs to produce output. Compared to the Cobb-Douglas technology which is often employed
in business cycle models, this form of production technology is less restrictive and allows for
flexible substitutability between capital and labour inputs.6 The CES production technology
is given by:
Yt = ε
a
t
[
α
1
νK
ν−1
ν
t + (1− α)
1
νN
ν−1
ν
t
] ν
ν−1
(2.9)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the share of capital income, and ν ∈ (0,∞) is the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour. εat is the technology shock, which follows an AR(1) process given
by:
ln(εat ) = ρa ln(ε
a
t−1) + 
a
t , 
a
t ∼ NIID(0, σa). (2.10)
The firm’s problem is to maximise the profit in equation (2.8) given the level of output
defined in equation (2.9). Given that there is no price friction, the firm’s profit is zero.
2.2.3 Government
In each period, the government decides on a set of fiscal instruments that satisfy its budget
constraint given by:
Gt + Zt +Bt = τ
c
tCt + τ
w
t WtNt + τ
k
t (r
k
t − δ)Kt +
Bt+1
Rt
(2.11)
Rearranging this, the evolution of government debt can be written as:
Bt+1
Rt
= Bt +Dt, (2.12)
where Dt = [Gt + Zt]−
[
τ ctCt + τ
w
t WtNt + τ
k
t (r
k
t − δp)Kt
]
, (2.13)
which states that the discounted level of public debt at the end of period t is the sum of the
6Cantore et al. (2017) show that empirical estimates from structural VAR are consistent with real business
cycle (RBC) model with less than unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. Also, Cantore
et al. (2014) demonstrate that the response of hours depends on the capital-labour substitution elasticity in
both New-Keynesian and standard RBC models.
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stock of public debt at the beginning of period t and the primary deficit, Dt, in the current
period. To ensure stability, a set of fiscal rules is specified to track the time-path of government
debt for effective financing, deleveraging and moderation towards the steady state. In designing
the fiscal rules, we consider recent experience in the UK, whereby the government is interested
in cutting public consumption spending and social transfers, as well as raising taxes on income
and wealth. Equipped with these facts, we assume that government consumption spending and
transfers are counter-cyclical and respond negatively to public debt, while distortionary taxes
on labour and capital income are pro-cyclical and respond positively to government debt. In
addition, following the analysis of Kliem & Kriwoluzky (2014), we assume that distortionary
taxes on capital and labour income respond mainly to the investment component of the business
cycle. We further assume that consumption taxes neither respond to debt nor the business cycle,
and that shocks to the taxes are correlated, since fiscal authorities often make decisions on taxes
simultaneously. Formally, the following fiscal rules are specified for the UK economy:
ln(Gt) = −θg ln(Bt)− ωg ln(Yt) + εgt (2.14)
ln(Zt) = −θz ln(Bt)− ωz ln(Yt) + εzt (2.15)
ln(τ kt ) = θτk ln(Bt) + ωτk ln(It) + ε
τk
t + χknε
τw
t + χkcε
τc
t (2.16)
ln(τwt ) = θτw ln(Bt) + ωτw ln(It) + ε
τw
t + χknε
τk
t + χncε
τc
t (2.17)
ln(τ ct ) = ε
τc
t + χncε
τw
t + χkcε
τk
t (2.18)
where θl and ωl are the parameters of fiscal adjustments to government debt and business cycle
variables respectively. χkc, χkc and χkc are the parameters of the cross-correlations of the tax
shocks. εlt are the fiscal policy shocks which follow AR(1) processes given by:
ln(εlt) = ρl ln(ε
l
t−1) + 
l
t, 
l
t ∼ NIID(0, σl), for l ∈ (g, z, τ c, τw, τ k). (2.19)
Substituting the fiscal rules in equations (2.14) to (2.19) into the evolution of government
debt in equation (2.12), we can derive the steady state stability condition for the model as:
|θl|> (1− β)B/Y
X/Y
(2.20)
where X/Y ∈ (G
Y
, Z
Y
, τ
wWN
Y
, τ
k(rk−δ)K
Y
) are the ratios of government spending and tax revenue
components to GDP. It is assumed that the government debt is non-zero at steady state.
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2.2.4 Market Clearing Conditions
The market clearing condition for the economy implies that the sum of spending by all agents in
the economy should be equal to the total output. Hence, the economy-wide resource constraint
can be written as:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (2.21)
The aggregate value of consumption, labour supply, investment, capital, government debt
and transfers in the economy are given by:
Ct = (1− λ)Crt + λCht (2.22)
Nt = (1− λ)N rt + λNht (2.23)
It = (1− λ)Irt (2.24)
Kt = (1− λ)Krt (2.25)
Bt = (1− λ)Brt (2.26)
Zt = (1− λ)Zrt + λZht (2.27)
Unlike Gal´ı et al. (2007) and Rossi (2014), this paper does not assume steady state equality
in consumption across different types of households (see the Appendix for the computation of
steady state values).7 Rather, following Natvik (2012), the steady-state consumption for each
type of household is endogenously derived from the model. Since there is no discrimination in
the labour market, all households face the same real wage and equality of steady state hours is
assumed across households.8
2.3 Estimation
To solve the model, we derive the first order solutions to the household’s and firm’s problems and
combine them with the equilibrium conditions and constraints to generate a system of equations.
Each equation of the model is then log-linearised, such that the responses of the variables can
7Several studies, such as Gal´ı et al. (2007), assume steady-state equality in consumption across households,
that is, Ch = Cr = C. The problem with this equality assumption is that individual private consumption
of different classes of agents are forced to be equal irrespective of their income and wealth differentials at
steady-state. For instance, Mankiw (2000) shows that an increase in government debt is a source of steady-
state inequality in consumption between spender and saver households, since an increase in public debt implies
higher wealth for the Ricardian households. However, this kind of equality constraint may be valid in models
with no private capital accumulation and no wage differentials.
8As an alternative, Natvik (2012) analyses a case where each class of households belongs to different labour
unions, which bargain for different levels of nominal wage on behalf of their members, and supplying different
units of labour hour at steady state.
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Figure 2.2: The Observables (1987:Q1 – 2010:Q2).
Notes: This figure shows the one-sided HP-filtered series used in the estimation of this model. The vertical axis
measures the percentage deviations from the (stochastic) steady-state, represented by the zero-line, while the
horizontal axis measures the quarterly period.
be interpreted as percentage deviations from the steady-state. The linearised model (see the
Appendix) is then estimated using the Bayesian estimation techniques as described by An &
Schorfheide (2007).
2.3.1 Data and Estimation Procedure
The model is estimated on quarterly UK time series for the period 1987:Q1 – 2010:Q2, a total
of 94 observations. The start period is motivated the availability of quality quarterly series,
especially the government debt and fiscal data which are only available from 1987. The end
period coincides with the period before the implementation of recent consolidation policy in
the UK. In line with the standard practice in the literature, we exclude the recent period of
consolidation (that is, post-2010:Q2) from the baseline estimation to avoid possible biasness.9
In Section 2.4.5, we check the sensitivity of the estimated parameters to the consolidation era by
extending the data period to 1987:Q1 – 2015:Q3 (a total of 115 observations). Nine variables are
included in the model estimation: private consumption, hours worked, investment, government
debt, government consumption, government transfers, consumption tax revenue, capital tax
revenue and labour tax revenue. The data are collected from the online database of the Office
for National Statistics (ONS). Since we are estimating a real business cycle model, all variables
9Recent empirical papers on fiscal policy often cut their data period before the financial crisis era in order to
avoid possible biasness associated with that period. For instance, Corsetti & Mu¨ller (2014) estimate the effect
of US government spending for the period 1980:Q1 to 2007:Q4, thereby cutting off the crisis period.
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are expressed in per capita real terms using GDP price deflator and the active population (age
16 to 59/64). In line with the suggestion of Pfeifer (2018), the adjusted series are de-trended
using the one-sided HP-filter and the filtered series are demeaned.10
Figure 2.2 shows the stochastically de-trended series of the observables. From the figure,
it can be observed that during the financial crisis, all macroeconomic variables fell below their
trend levels, with total investment and government revenues (especially capital tax revenue)
witnessing much larger falls compared to other variables. On the other hand, the government-
initiated bailout plans aimed at stemming the effects of the crisis led to a rise in government
debt above its trend level, which confirms the earlier argument in this paper. On average,
government debt tends to be highly persistent with large changes over time; whereas, tax
revenues are less persistent.
The model is initially estimated in three different versions, inclusive of all fiscal instruments:
the baseline model with estimated share of rule-of-thumb households (λ ∈ (0, 0.5)), the standard
representative agent model with no rule-of-thumb behaviour (λ = 0), and the model with equal
proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers (λ = 0.5) as it is the case in most existing analytical
studies. Thereafter, the preferred model is re-estimated to include only a specific choice of fiscal
instruments permitted to respond to debt; that is, government consumption only, government
transfer only and taxes only.
To estimate the model, the observables (the detrended variables) are mapped directly to the
model variables. Then, the data likelihood and prior are combined to maximise the log posterior
function, followed by the initiation of the Metropolis-Hasting (MH) algorithm which samples
from the posterior distribution using 1,000,000 draws over two chains, with the first 200,000
draws used as the burn-in period. The MH jump-scale (step-size) is sufficiently tuned up to
give an average acceptance rate of about 30%, which is comfortably within the expected band
of 25-33% (see Adjemian et al. (2011)). Finally, the Brooks & Gelman (1998)’s convergence
diagnostics is performed to ensure that the Monte Carlo Markov Chains (MCMC) converge to
unique posterior value.
2.3.2 Calibration
Table 2.1 presents the values assigned to calibrated parameters and steady state ratios. These
parameters are kept constant because the observables cannot uniquely estimate many free
10The latter process of demeaning is necessary because detrended data from one-sided HP-filter have non-
zero sum. In fact, in most cases, estimation results from the non-demean filtered series always show evidence
of unit-roots and serial correlation.
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Table 2.1: Calibrated parameters and steady state ratios
steady-state ratio
Parameter or
Description Value
Preference
β Subjective discount factor 0.9926
% Public consumption share in CES aggregate 0.25
Technology
δ Private capital depreciation rate 0.025
α Share of capital in production CES 1/3
ν Capital-labour elasticity of substitution 0.924
Fiscal Policy
τ c Consumption tax rate 0.1976
τw Labour income tax 0.2271
τ k Capital income tax 0.3082
G/Y Government consumption to GDP ratio 0.2016
Z/Y Government transfers to GDP ratio 0.1091
B/4Y Government debt to GDP ratio 0.4772
Notes: This table shows the calibrated values of selected parameters and steady state ratios in the model.
β is calibrated to match the annualised real interest rate of 3%. % is calibrated as the ratio of government
consumption spending to the sum of government and private consumption spending. Conditioned on α, ν is
calibrated to match steady state investment ratio.
parameters and steady state values. The subjective discount factor, β, is set to 0.9926, implying
an annualised real interest rate of 3%. Regarding the productivity of public consumption goods,
the share of government consumption in the effective consumption CES, %, is set to 0.25, which
is an approximation of the ratio of government consumption to total final consumption for the
UK. This value is similar to the one assigned by Coenen et al. (2013) for the Euro Area.
In line with existing literature, the depreciation rate of capital, δ, is set to 0.025, suggesting
that capital stock depreciates at an annual rate of 10%. Following the literature on CES
production technology, such as Cantore & Levine (2012), the share of capital technology, α,
and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, ν, are interdependent. Given the
model set-up in this paper, α can be computed and interpreted as the capital income share
conditioned on the degree of discounting imposed by the substitution elasticity (ν) on the steady
state real rental cost, rk.11 Given this interaction, we set α to 1/3 - which is the standard
11Based on the set-up of the CES production technology in this paper, from the firms’ problem, the steady
state first order condition for capital can be written as
rk =
(
α
Y
K
)ν
∴ α =
(
rk
)1/ν K
Y
,
which simply shows that ν is a discounting term on rk, while the capital-output ratio is unaffected by the
discounting term.
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share of capital in the literature - and then compute the degree of discounting imposed to
achieve that value by calibrating ν to match steady state investment-to-GDP ratio of 18.11%.
This calibration yields a value of 0.924 for ν. This calibrated value of ν is consistent with
the empirical findings of Cantore et al. (2017) which shows that the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour is less than unity, with the estimated mean value ranging between
0.2 and 0.9 (Cantore et al. 2017, p. 150).
Turning to steady state values of the fiscal variables, the distortionary tax rates τ c, τw and
τ k are set to about 20%, 23% and 31% respectively, which are close to the values assigned
by Coenen et al. (2013) for the Euro Area. The consumption tax rate is obtained from the
definition of consumption tax revenue in the model, which involves dividing the consumption
tax revenue by total private consumption. Labour tax rate is set to the average marginal income
tax rate for the period. Capital tax rate is set to the average capital gains tax over the sample
period. Using the annualised Maastricht consolidated government debt statistics, the quarterly
debt-to-GDP ratio is computed to be about 48%. Given these values, the ratio of government
transfers to GDP is then calibrated endogenously from the model to be around 11%, which is
consistent with the actual data for the UK.
2.3.3 Prior Distributions
The prior distributions of the estimated parameters of the model are presented in columns
1-3 of Table 2.2. The prior means are set in line with existing studies on UK and European
economies, including Bhattarai & Trzeciakiewicz (2017), McManus (2015), Coenen et al. (2013)
and Christoffel et al. (2008); while the standard errors are set to ensure that the estimated
parameter values are within the empirically and theoretically acceptable domain. For the
structural parameters, a gamma distribution is assumed for both relative risk aversion, σ, and
Frisch labour elasticity, η, with the respective prior means set to 1.75 and 0.50, and standard
deviations of 0.50 and 0.10. The habit formation parameter, κ, is assumed to follow a beta
distribution with a prior mean of 0.50 and standard deviation of 0.10.
In setting the prior distribution for the proportion of rule-of-thumb households, λ, in the
baseline model, this paper relies on the findings of Campbell & Mankiw (1989, 1990, 1991),
Chyi & Huang (1997), Kaplan & Violante (2014) and Kaplan et al. (2014). To estimate the
proportion of HtM agents in the economy with a range of 0-0.5, we assume that λ follows a beta
distribution with a mean of 0.50 and a standard error of 0.10. For the elasticity of substitution
between private and public goods, ϕ, we assume a gamma distribution with a mean of 0.30
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Table 2.2: Prior and Posterior Distributions
Parameter
Prior distribution Posterior distribution - Mean [5% and 95%]
Density Mean Std. λ ∈ (0, 0.5)
Baseline
Agent λ = 0
Representative
λ = 0.50
Gali-type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Structural
Risk aversion, σ Gamma 1.50 0.50 1.67 [1.04, 2.35] 1.69 [1.05, 2.36] 1.53 [0.92, 2.15]
Frisch elast., η Gamma 0.50 0.10 0.37 [0.22, 0.52] 0.33 [0.20, 0.47] 0.44 [0.27, 0.62]
Consump elast., ϕ Gamma 0.30 0.10 0.31 [0.21, 0.44] 0.29 [0.18, 0.42] 0.34 [0.22, 0.47]
Habit, κ Beta 0.50 0.10 0.37 [0.22, 0.52] 0.38 [0.23, 0.52] 0.35 [0.21, 0.50]
Share of HtM, λ Beta 0.50 0.10 0.26 [0.15, 0.37]
Adj costs, φ Gamma 4.00 1.25 3.43 [2.11, 4.96] 3.47 [2.12, 4.96] 3.39 [2.02, 4.92]
B: Fiscal Rule
Govt sp. adj. to B, θg Gamma 0.25 0.15 0.049 [0.006, 0.10] 0.053 [0.007, 0.11] 0.043 [0.005, 0.09]
Transfers adj. to B, θz Gamma 0.25 0.15 0.070 [0.010, 0.14] 0.075 [0.012, 0.15] 0.062 [0.009, 0.12]
Lab tax adj. to B, θτw Gamma 0.25 0.15 0.100 [0.014, 0.20] 0.116 [0.018, 0.22] 0.082 [0.010, 0.17]
Cap tax adj. to B, θτk Gamma 0.25 0.15 0.147 [0.016, 0.30] 0.149 [0.016, 0.31] 0.149 [0.015, 0.31]
Govt sp. adj. to Y, ωg Gamma 0.40 0.25 0.265 [0.026, 0.54] 0.268 [0.029, 0.55] 0.268 [0.029, 0.55]
Transfer adj. to Y, ωz Gamma 0.40 0.25 0.130 [0.008, 0.28] 0.130 [0.010, 0.28] 0.134 [0.010, 0.29]
Lab. tax adj. to I, ωτw Gamma 0.50 0.30 0.269 [0.075, 0.46] 0.258 [0.077, 0.45] 0.269 [0.070, 0.47]
Cap. tax adj. to I, ωτk Gamma 0.50 0.30 0.254 [0.036, 0.50] 0.251 [0.032, 0.49] 0.251 [0.034, 0.49]
Cap/lab co-term, χkn Normal 0.00 0.20 0.093 [0.007, 0.18] 0.093 [0.006, 0.18] 0.091 [0.004, 0.18]
Cap/cons co-term, χkc Normal 0.00 0.20 0.042 [-0.025, 0.11] 0.043 [-0.023, 0.11] 0.041 [-0.026, 0.11]
Lab/cons co-term, χnc Normal 0.00 0.20 -0.002 [-0.098, 0.09] -0.004 [-0.098, 0.09] -0.004 [-0.099, 0.09]
C: AR(1) Coef.
Preference, ρu Beta 0.50 0.20 0.39 [0.25, 0.52] 0.37 [0.23, 0.50] 0.42 [0.29, 0.54]
Labour supply, ρn Beta 0.50 0.20 0.94 [0.88, 0.99] 0.94 [0.88, 0.99] 0.94 [0.87, 0.99]
Inv-specific, ρi Beta 0.50 0.20 0.11 [0.01, 0.22] 0.11 [0.01, 0.22] 0.12 [0.02, 0.23]
Technology, ρa Beta 0.50 0.20 0.88 [0.78, 0.97] 0.89 [0.79, 0.97] 0.87 [0.77, 0.96]
Govt Sp., ρg Beta 0.50 0.20 0.77 [0.63, 0.91] 0.77 [0.63, 0.91] 0.78 [0.64, 0.91]
Transfer, ρz Beta 0.50 0.20 0.70 [0.54, 0.86] 0.69 [0.53, 0.85] 0.71 [0.55, 0.86]
Consump. tax, ρτc Beta 0.50 0.20 0.65 [0.47, 0.83] 0.64 [0.45, 0.83] 0.66 [0.48, 0.84]
Cap. tax, ρτk Beta 0.50 0.20 0.61 [0.44, 0.76] 0.60 [0.43, 0.76] 0.62 [0.46, 0.78]
Lab. tax, ρτw Beta 0.50 0.20 0.43 [0.23, 0.62] 0.42 [0.23, 0.61] 0.46 [0.26, 0.66]
D: Std. of Shocks
Preference, σu Inv. Gam 0.10 2.00 0.041 [0.033, 0.051] 0.039 [0.031, 0.047] 0.047 [0.038, 0.058]
Labour supply, σn Inv. Gam 0.10 2.00 0.031 [0.024, 0.038] 0.033 [0.026, 0.041] 0.028 [0.022, 0.034]
Inv-specific, σi Inv. Gam 0.10 2.00 0.086 [0.056, 0.120] 0.086 [0.055, 0.120] 0.086 [0.055, 0.120]
Technology, σa Inv. Gam 0.10 2.00 0.012 [0.012, 0.013] 0.012 [0.012, 0.013] 0.012 [0.012, 0.013]
Govt sp., σg Inv. Gam 0.10 2.00 0.015 [0.012, 0.017] 0.015 [0.012, 0.017] 0.015 [0.012, 0.017]
Transfer, σz Inv. Gam 0.10 2.00 0.016 [0.014, 0.018] 0.016 [0.014, 0.018] 0.016 [0.014, 0.018]
Consump. tax, στc Inv. Gam 0.10 2.00 0.021 [0.018, 0.024] 0.021 [0.018, 0.024] 0.021 [0.018, 0.024]
Cap. tax, στk Inv. Gam 0.10 2.00 0.059 [0.051, 0.068] 0.059 [0.051, 0.068] 0.059 [0.051, 0.068]
Lab. tax, στw Inv. Gam 0.10 2.00 0.034 [0.029, 0.039] 0.034 [0.029, 0.039] 0.034 [0.029, 0.039]
E: Model Comp.
Log data density 2004.60 2014.38 1997.41
Bayes factor 1.00 exp(−9.78) exp(7.19)
Notes: This table presents the prior and posterior distributions of estimated parameters in the baseline model,
compared to an alternative representative model with no rule-of-thumb behaviour, and a Gal´ı et al. (2007)-type
model with an equal proportion of Ricardian and rule-of-thumb consumers. The values in the brackets are
the 5% and 95% posterior intervals. Each variant of the model is estimated using the Bayesian method with
1,000,000 MCMC draws over two chains. 20% of the draws are used for the burn-in period. All the models are
estimated on UK data for the period 1987:Q1 – 2010:Q2.
and a standard deviation of 0.10, implying that private and public consumption are close
complements as the literature suggests (see Bouakez & Rebei (2007), Coenen et al. (2013),
Ercolani & e Azevedo (2014)). The investment adjustment costs parameter, φ, is assumed to
follow a gamma distribution with a mean of 4.00 and a standard error of 1.25.
20
The priors for fiscal rule parameters are set to ensure stability of the model as described
in equation (2.20). The parameters of fiscal adjustments to government debt, θl, are assumed
to follow a gamma distribution with a mean of 0.25 and standard deviation of 0.15, which
allow them to take on only non-zero values. Similarly, parameters of fiscal adjustments to the
business cycle are assumed to follow a gamma distribution. We set a prior mean of 0.40 and
a standard deviation of 0.20 for ωg and ωz, while ωτw and ωτk take on a mean of 0.50 and a
standard deviation of 0.30. The parameters of the interactions between shocks to distortionary
taxes, χij, are assumed to follow a normal distribution with zero mean and a standard deviation
of 0.20. In line with existing literature, AR(1) coefficients of the exogenous shock processes,
ρx, are assumed to follow a beta distribution with a prior mean of 0.50 and standard deviation
of 0.20, which sufficiently allow the parameters to reflect their level of persistence. Finally, an
inverse gamma distribution is assumed for the standard deviation of the shocks, σx, with the
mean and standard error set to 0.10 and 2.00 respectively.
2.4 Results
In this section, the results of the Bayesian estimation are discussed and the impulse responses for
the various specifications of the model are analysed comparatively. Following An & Schorfheide
(2007), Canova & Sala (2009), Iskrev (2010) and Ratto & Iskrev (2011), we check the iden-
tification strength of the estimated parameters relative to the prior assigned to them in the
preceding section. The result shows that all the parameters are uniquely identified, with no
serial correlation (see the Appendix for the graphical result). This suggests that each estimated
parameter plays a distinctively significant role in the dynamics of the model.
2.4.1 Posterior Distributions
The results of the Bayesian estimation for the baseline model, as well as the two alternative
specifications of the model, are presented in columns 4-7 of Table 2.2. The results show the
posterior mean for each parameter along with the 5% and 95% posterior intervals in the square
brackets. From the table, all the parameters are estimated to be significantly different from
zero, except for the comovement terms between capital and consumption taxes, as well as that
between labour and consumption taxes. With the exception of the preference shock, investment-
specific technology shock and labour tax shock, all other shocks are estimated to be relatively
persistent with the autoregressive parameter much higher than the assumed prior mean of 0.5.
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We estimate the proportion of hand-to-mouth households, λ, for the UK economy to be
about 26% at mean, while the upper bound is about one-third. Our estimate of λ is consistent
with a recent report by the Office for National Statistics (2018) which shows that about 26%
of all UK households can not make ends meet for more than a month if they lost their main
source of income. The estimate is also consistent with figures documented in the literature. For
instance, using seasonally adjusted quarterly data for the period 1957:Q2 – 1988:Q2, Campbell
& Mankiw (1991) empirically estimate λ to be in the range of 20.1 – 37.2% for the UK.
Di Bartolomeo et al. (2011) estimate the proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers in the UK to
be 43.3% and 26.1% for the G7 countries (including UK) in a New-Keynesian DSGE model. In
a more recent study which utilises micro-level data, Kaplan et al. (2014) estimate the proportion
of hand-to-mouth households in the UK to be around one-third. All these previous findings
corroborate our results.
For the non-policy structural parameters, all estimated values are relatively the same across
the three specifications and are consistent with the estimates in the literature. The estimated
value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1
σ
, is less than one in all variants of the
model, suggesting that the elasticity of real interest rate to consumption growth is less than one-
for-one. Similarly, the Frisch elasticity, η, is between one-third and one-half; the habit stock is
estimated to be just about one-third of past consumption level; while the consumption elasticity,
ϕ, is estimated to be around the assumed prior mean of 0.30, suggesting close substitutability
of public and private consumption goods. Interestingly, as we move away from a representative
agent specification, with no rule-of-thumb behaviour, to a specification in which half of the
households are rule-of-thumb consumers, σ decreases from about 1.7 to 1.5 (a 12 percentage
point decrease), while η increases from 0.33 to 0.44 (a 33 percentage point increase). This result
suggests that, as the proportion of financially constrained households increases, real interest
rate becomes less responsive to aggregate consumption growth while aggregate labour effort
becomes more responsive to after-tax real wage.
Turning to the fiscal policy parameters, the result shows that all the fiscal instruments
respond considerably to government debt. The estimates of the fiscal rule parameters are
all positive, since sign restrictions have been imposed on them in equations (2.14) – (2.19).
However, the responses of expenditure-based instruments to debt innovations are relatively
weaker compared to tax-based instruments, with capital tax rates having the highest response
while government consumption has the least response. Comparing the results across model
specifications, it can be observed that, at higher values of λ, the parameter estimates of fiscal
adjustment to debt diminish in value – most notably for transfers and labour tax rates. This
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suggests that fiscal instruments targeted at reducing public debt become weaker when the
proportion of financially constrained households is higher. The implication of this result is
that the achievement of government consolidation targets becomes prolonged as the degree of
household’s financial constraints intensifies. Furthermore, the responses of fiscal instruments to
the business cycle are moderate and relatively stable across specifications. The counter-cyclical
response of government spending to output is nearly twice that of transfers, while labour and
capital taxes have similar pro-cyclical responses to investment.
Finally, the last panel of Table 2.2 presents some statistics for model comparison across
different specifications. The log-marginal data density is computed using the modified harmonic
mean estimator of Geweke (1999). The Bayes factor is the ratio of conditional probabilities
of observing the data from a given model, which are reflected in the marginal data densities
(Koop 2003, Ch. 1, p. 1-4). The Bayes factor for each specification is computed relative to the
baseline model; hence, the Bayes factor of one for the baseline specification. From the results
presented in Panel E of the table, the Bayes factor favours the representative agent specification
with no rule-of-thumb behaviour, but discriminates against models with higher proportion of
non-Ricardian households. One possible explanation for this could be that, while introducing
non-Ricardian households is one mechanism through which increases in government spending
are associated with increases in private consumption (Gal´ı et al. 2007), this mechanism appears
to be weak in the data. However, based on the results, we can actually compare the models and
say how much preferable the baseline specification is, compared to the counterfactual models.
2.4.2 Impulse Responses
Figures 2.3-2.7 display the estimated impulse responses to a one standard deviation fiscal con-
solidation shock. The impulse responses are generated from model simulations based on the
estimated posterior mean of the parameters. The plots also show how changes in the proportion
of financially constrained households influence the dynamic responses of the variables to fiscal
shocks. The solid lines, dotted lines and dashed lines represent the mean impulse responses
from the baseline model, the representative agent model and the Gal´ı-type model respectively.
In each plot, the first row displays the response of the fiscal instrument being analysed as well as
aggregate and household-specific consumption responses, the second row displays the responses
of the labour market variables, while the third row displays the aggregate macroeconomic and
bond market variables. The horizontal axis measures the quarters after the initial impact of the
shock, while the vertical axis measures the percentage deviation from steady state or percentage
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Figure 2.3: Estimated Impulse Responses to a One Standard Deviation Decrease in
UK Government Consumption Spending.
Notes: Solid line denotes mean impulse response from the baseline model with estimated λ = 0.26. Dotted line
denotes the representative model with λ = 0, while the dashed line denotes the model with equal proportion of
Ricardian and HtM consumers, that is λ = 0.50.
Figure 2.4: Estimated Impulse Responses to a One Standard Deviation Decrease in
UK Government Transfers.
Notes: See Figure 2.3
points deviation for long-term real rate.
Figure 2.3 shows the effect of a spending cut in government consumption. Private con-
sumption initially rises on impact, but then falls below its steady state level after the second
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quarter until the end of the consolidation in the third year before rising again.12 The response
of private consumption is driven by two forces: the substitution effect of a public spending cut
which drives up private consumption on impact and the complementarity effect of productive
government spending which drives the subsequent fall. Aggregate labour effort falls while real
wage rises, thereby causing output to fall contemporaneously. Also, government debt falls in
response to the spending cuts, leading to a sharp fall in long-term real interest rate. The fall
in real rate crowds-in private investment, which in turn improves the marginal productivity of
labour, and leads to output expansion after six quarters. This result confirms the findings of
Ercolani & e Azevedo (2014) that government spending shock has a counter-cyclical effect on
private consumption, but negates the results of Bouakez & Rebei (2007) and Gal´ı et al. (2007)
which observed a pro-cyclical response of private consumption to government spending shock.
Turning to household-specific responses, Ricardian consumption rises on impact and then
falls after two quarters in a pattern similar to the response of aggregate consumption. On the
other hand, government spending cut crowds out the consumption of hand-to-mouth households
on impact, but the effect is reversed after one year. The result shows that the complementarity
effect of government consumption dominates the substitution effect in HtM effective consump-
tion bundle in the short run. Also, government spending cut discourages labour effort in both
households, but the decline in Ricardian labour effort is about three times as much as that of
HtM households. While Ricardian hours marginally rises above its steady state level after six
quarters, HtM hours persistently remain below its potential level for at least five years. Also,
while non-Ricardian consumption comoves with government consumption response, Ricardian
and aggregate consumption responses move in opposite directions. This result is in line with
the findings of Coenen & Straub (2005) which show that, in response to government spending
shock, Ricardian consumption accounts for most changes in aggregate consumption.
Figure 2.4 plots responses to a spending cut in government transfers aimed at financing
public debt innovations. Consumption falls on impact while hours rise, implying that govern-
ment transfer has distortionary effects. However, output rises across all horizons suggesting an
expansionary effect of fiscal consolidation. Long-term real rate falls as government’s borrowing
falls. The relative degree of household’s financial constraints significantly influences the dy-
namic responses of aggregate variables to debt innovations induced by transfer cut. The larger
the share of rule-of-thumb consumers, the higher the impact and amplification effects of the
shock, and the more persistent is the responses of key macroeconomic variables. Specifically,
the output multiplier effect of government transfer increases with the share of rule-of-thumb
12Note that government consumption spending adjusts close to its steady state level by the third year.
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Figure 2.5: Estimated Impulse Responses to a One Standard Deviation increase in
the Consumption Tax Rate.
Notes: See Figure 2.3
consumers. This result is in line with the findings of Drautzburg & Uhlig (2015) which show
that the proportion of government transfers to the financially constrained households influences
the fiscal multiplier. Since government transfers constitute a major part of HtM household in-
come, HtM consumption falls significantly in response to transfer cuts, while their labour effort
rises to compensate for the loss of unearned income.13 On the other hand, Ricardian consump-
tion rises in the first year, while labour effort falls. This is because, for Ricardian households,
public transfer to the HtM households is equivalent to a lump-sum tax.
The effect of a rise in consumption tax rate is displayed in Figure 2.5. As the theory
suggests, both aggregate and household-specific consumption fall in the short run, investment
rises and aggregate hours fall, which in turn causes output to fall on impact. However, the
dynamic responses of household-specific consumption and employment differ considerably. On
impact, HtM consumption falls by more than twice the decrease in aggregate consumption,
causing them to work more in order to boost their consumption level. The increased hours pay
off after a year as HtM consumption rises above its trend level. On the other hand, the rise in
consumption tax rate is sufficient to discourage Ricardian labour effort on impact, but this effect
is reversed after three quarters. Also, as the proportion of financially constrained households
rises, Ricardian households increase their investment in capital goods as real rate falls even
more, thereby motivating them to substitute more labour for leisure, which translates into
13Note that the government transfers analysed in this paper are unearned income to the households. They
are synonymous to ‘social benefit other than social transfer’ in the 2008 System of National Accounts.
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Figure 2.6: Estimated Impulse Responses to a One Standard Deviation increase in
the Labour Tax Rate.
Notes: See Figure 2.3
Figure 2.7: Estimated Impulse Responses to a One Standard Deviation increase in
the Capital Tax Rate.
Notes: See Figure 2.3
higher Ricardian consumption response on impact.14 Furthermore, as λ increases, government
debt response is amplified across all horizons, while the response of real wage is amplified in
the medium-run.
In Figure 2.6, a rise in tax rate on labour income discourages labour efforts due to the
14See also Figures 2.6 and 2.7.
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negative wealth effect of distortionary taxes. As a result, output falls while real wage rises as
the demand for labour outweighs supply. Aggregate and household-specific consumption also
fall as after-tax income declines. Compared to Ricardian households, HtM consumption falls
much more – by about three times the initial decrease in aggregate consumption, causing HtM
labour effort to rise on impact to compensate for the loss in after-tax income. On the other
hand, the increase in labour tax is strong enough to discourage Ricardian labour efforts, which
outweighs the positive response of HtM labour effort; hence, the decline in aggregate labour
effort. The positive interaction between capital and labour tax shocks further interacts with the
low labour supply to dampen the marginal productivity of capital, thereby causing investment
to fall, though the impact effect is dependent on the size of λ through its effect on long-term
real rate.
Figure 2.7 reports responses to a rise in capital tax rate. As capital and labour taxes are
correlated, a rise in capital tax rate causes aggregate consumption and hours to fall on impact.
The fall in labour supply reinforces the negative effect of a rise in capital taxes on the demand
for new capital goods, causing output to contract. However, output rises in the medium run
as the marginal productivity of labour improves. Given the response of hours, real wage rises
on impact but falls as employment increases. This result is in line with the findings of Leeper,
Plante & Traum (2010) which shows that an increase in capital tax rates crowds out private
consumption, investment, employment and output. Regarding household-specific responses,
HtM consumption falls while HtM hours rises in response to a rise in capital tax rate. On the
other hand, the relative degree of household’s financial constraints drives the responsiveness
of Ricardian households to capital taxes: as λ becomes larger, Ricardian households work less
and consume more, while spending more on investment goods as long-term real rate falls even
more.
Comparing the results across various instruments, in response to debt innovations, labour
tax rate is relatively less persistent, dying out after just a year, compared to other fiscal in-
struments that return to steady state level after two to three years. In line with the findings of
Erceg & Linde´ (2013), Pappa et al. (2015) and Alesina, Barbiero, Favero, Giavazzi & Paradisi
(2015) and Alesina, Favero & Giavazzi (2015), our results show that expenditure-based consol-
idations are less costly in terms of output loss compared to tax-based consolidation. However,
in contrast to their findings, fiscal consolidation based on cuts in government consumption
spending tends to be more costly in the short run compared to other fiscal instruments. In
cumulative terms, fiscal consolidation based on labour tax hike tends to be costlier compared
to any other fiscal instrument since it does not lead to output expansion in the medium run
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after the initial output contraction. Hence, the cumulative multiplier effect of a labour tax
hike remains negative both in the short and long runs. Comparing the response of government
debt to a one-standard deviation shock to each fiscal instrument, our results show that, for
the UK economy, expenditure-based fiscal adjustments have much larger effects on government
debt in the short-run compared to tax-based fiscal adjustments. More so, irrespective of the
choice of fiscal instrument, the larger the proportion of HtM consumers in the economy, the
more amplified and persistent is the response of government debt.
In summary, the above results show that household agents respond quite differently to gov-
ernment debt-financing strategies. Irrespective of the choice of fiscal instrument, the Ricardian
households work less and consume more compared to the HtM households. One way to in-
terpret this result is that government’s fiscal financing of public debt, which is solely held by
the Ricardian households, translates into higher interest-income on government bond for the
Ricardian households. This, in turn, raises the level of Ricardian consumption, causing leisure
to rise while labour hour falls. On the other hand, in response to consolidation shocks, HtM
agents intensify their labour efforts in order to meet up with their current consumption level.
2.4.3 Alternative Fiscal Consolidation Strategies
To further investigate the results reported in the previous section, we re-estimate the baseline
model under various alternative fiscal arrangements. Following Leeper, Plante & Traum (2010),
we examine cases where only government spending, only transfers or only the taxes respond to
government debt innovations. The estimated posterior mean of parameters in these alternative
specifications are reported in column 7-9 of Table 2.3, while the impulse responses based on the
estimated results are displayed in Figures 2.8 and 2.9. The reported results in Table 2.3 shows
that the estimated parameters of the three alternative specifications are qualitatively similar to
those in the baseline model. Even the fiscal adjustment parameters in the alternative models
with individual policy instrument are quite close to that of the baseline model with all fiscal
instruments inclusive, save for marginal differences.
In Figures 2.8 and 2.9, the estimated impulse responses to government consumption spend-
ing shocks are displayed in the first row, responses to transfer shocks are displayed in the second
row, while the third and fourth rows display the impulse responses to labour and capital tax
shocks respectively. Solid lines denote impulse responses from the baseline model with all fiscal
instruments simultaneously responding to government debt innovations. Dotted lines, dashed
lines and dotted-dashed lines respectively denote specifications in which only government con-
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Table 2.3: Further Results
Parameter only Adjust
Govt Spending
Only Adjust
Transfer
Adjust
Taxes Only
% = 0 % = λ = 0 Data
Extended
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A: Structural
σ 1.65 1.69 1.68 1.83 1.88 1.78
η 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.34 0.35
ϕ 0.34 0.30 0.30 – – 0.32
κ 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.36
λ 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 – 0.24
φ 3.43 3.36 3.40 3.33 3.44 3.18
B: Fiscal Rule
θg 0.053 – – 0.052 0.056 0.042
θz – 0.077 – 0.069 0.074 0.062
θτw – – 0.099 0.098 0.114 0.102
θτk – – 0.150 0.145 0.146 0.136
ωg 0.238 0.258 0.261 0.236 0.234 0.213
ωz 0.127 0.131 0.128 0.130 0.131 0.113
ωτw 0.252 0.259 0.268 0.270 0.261 0.224
ωτk 0.240 0.244 0.252 0.251 0.250 0.257
χkn 0.083 0.081 0.093 0.097 0.098 0.068
χkc 0.045 0.044 0.041 0.043 0.044 0.046
χnc 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008
C: AR(1) Coefficients
ρu 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.33 0.32 0.36
ρn 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.95
ρi 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10
ρa 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.88
ρg 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.79
ρz 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.70
ρτc 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.61
ρτk 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.58
ρτw 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.45
D: Std. of Shocks
σu 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.039 0.036 0.039
σn 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.032 0.029
σi 0.086 0.085 0.085 0.084 0.086 0.076
σa 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
σg 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014
σz 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015
στc 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021
στk 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.064
στw 0.034 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.031
E: Model Comparison
Log-marginal data density 2010.24 2011.86 2011.57 2004.62 2013.82
Bayes factor exp(−5.64) exp(−7.26) exp(−6.97) exp(−0.02) exp(−9.22)
Notes: This table presents the posterior mean of other variants of the baseline specification. Columns 7-8
report the estimation results of alternative fiscal strategies where government spending only, transfer only or
taxes only adjust to government debt. Column 10 reports the result for the model with no government-in-utility,
while column 11 reports the result for the model with no government-in-utility and no rule-of-thumb behaviour.
Column 12 reports the result for the baseline model estimated on an extended dataset that include the period
of fiscal consolidation, that is, 1987:Q1-2015:Q3.
sumption adjusts, only transfers adjust, and only taxes adjust to debt innovations. From these
figures, the choice of fiscal consolidation strategy seems to have some influence on the dynamics
of macroeconomic variables. The responses of output, consumption, investment and hours are
very sensitive to the choice of fiscal strategy, especially when responding to transfer and labour
tax shocks, while only investment is sensitive to the choice of fiscal strategy when responding
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Figure 2.8: Estimated Economy-Wide Responses to Consolidation Shocks under
Alternative Fiscal Strategies.
Notes: Solid lines denote baseline model with all fiscal instruments simultaneous adjust to debt innovations.
Dotted lines, dashed lines and dotted-dashed lines denote the specifications in which only government consump-
tion spending adjusts, only government transfer adjusts, and only taxes adjust to debt innovations respectively.
Figure 2.9: Estimated Household-Specific Responses to Consolidation Shocks under
Alternative Fiscal Strategies.
Notes: See Figure 2.8.
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to labour taxes. Responses of the variables to government spending shock are less sensitive
to the choice of consolidation strategy. One possible explanation for this result could be the
distortionary nature of taxes and transfer spending (automatic stabilisers) in our model. Since
these automatic stabilisers are important components of government budget used in dampening
business cycle fluctuations, macroeconomic variables respond accordingly to the choice of these
instruments in financing government debt.
Meanwhile, irrespective of the consolidation shock hitting the economy, responses of output
and hours are much lower when only transfer adjusts to debt innovations. Consumption is much
lower when only government consumption spending adjusts to debt, which is possibly due to
the complementarity effect of public consumption in households’ effective consumption bundles.
Surprisingly, the response of investment to all fiscal shocks is relatively higher and positive at
most horizons when only taxes respond to government debt. Leeper, Plante & Traum (2010)
find similar results and argue that agents’ anticipation of a future decrease in taxes is the key
driver of the positive response of investment to distortionary tax shocks.15
Furthermore, from Figure 2.9, the response of Ricardian consumption tends to be relatively
smaller in the medium run when only government consumption adjusts to public debt, while
the response of Ricardian labour effort is marginally smaller when only transfer adjusts to
debt innovations. On the other hand, HtM households are relatively insensitive to the choice
of consolidation strategy except when responding to government spending shock. In response
to a negative government spending shock, HtM consumption decreases relatively more while
HtM hours fall relatively less when only government consumption spending adjusts to debt
innovations.
To conclude, macroeconomic variables are sensitive to the choice of fiscal strategy adopted to
deleverage government debt. Hence, government should selectively adopt fiscal strategies that
minimise output loss and have lower impact on consumption and labour preference decisions of
different types of households. This can be achieved by specifically targeting economic sectors or
household income-groups that are less sensitive or indifferent to a particular fiscal instrument.
2.4.4 Fiscal Consolidation and the Time-Path of Government Debt
In this section, the time-path of debt, as financed by alternative consolidation strategies, is
discussed. Figure 2.10 display the proportion of a one-unit innovation in government debt in
quarter t financed by each fiscal instrument in period t+M , where M represents the quarters
15See Figs 4 and 5 in Leeper, Plante & Traum (2010).
32
Figure 2.10: Time-path of Government Debt under Alternative Consolidation Strate-
gies.
Notes: This figure plots the response of government debt to one standard deviation consolidation shocks under
alternative fiscal strategies. The left panel plots government debt responses from the baseline model with
all instruments simultaneously adjusting to debt innovations, while the right panel plots responses from the
alternative models with only specific fiscal instruments adjusting to debt.
on the horizontal axis. Given the earlier findings of this paper, we considered only variants of
the baseline model with estimated proportion of rule-of-thumb households in this section. The
figure shows the time-path of government debt in the baseline model with all fiscal instruments
simultaneously adjusting to government debt (the left panel) compared to cases where only
specific fiscal instruments adjust to government debt (the right panel). Solid lines, dashed
lines, bubble lines and diamond lines represent fiscal adjustment of government consumption,
transfers, labour taxes and capital taxes to government debt respectively.
Evidence from Figure 2.10 shows that the deleveraging of government debt takes a consid-
erable period of time to be fully financed. From the left panel of the figure, it takes about 12 to
15 years for debt innovations induced by distortionary fiscal instruments (taxes and transfers)
to be fully financed, and about 20 – 23 years for debt innovations induced by government con-
sumption spending in the baseline model. This result is not quite surprising as earlier simulated
results show that tax hikes significantly affect both the supply (discourages labour supply and
crowds-out investment) and the demand (reduced households income and consumption) sides
of the economy, thereby causing more leakages in order to finance government debt within a
short period of time; whereas, spending cuts on government consumption and transfers mainly
affect the demand side. As a result, the peak effects of spending-induced debt innovation are
much stronger in the short run, while the rest are gradually financed over a longer horizon.
The right panel of Figure 2.10 shows that fiscal financing of debt innovation involves a
relatively different approach and takes much longer time when individual fiscal instruments are
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considered to finance debt innovations. Compared to the gradualist approach in the baseline
model, the models with individual distortionary fiscal adjustments seem to adopt a stronger
cold-turkey approach within the first 2-5 years and a perpetual gradualist approach afterwards;
whereas, debt innovations induced by only government spending initialised from the same
position as in the baseline model with all instruments, and is fully financed within the same 20
– 23 years. This result shows that models in which distortionary fiscal instruments individually
adjust to debt innovation are less tenable for policy purpose for a social planner constrained
by medium run deleveraging targets.
In summary, the results of this analysis suggest that the speed of fiscal-financing of debt
innovation depends on the adopted consolidation strategies and the extent to which such fiscal
instruments affect households’ preference decisions and macroeconomic productivity.
2.4.5 Further Sensitivity Analysis
We further check the sensitivity of estimated parameters to different specifications of our model
and to data sample. Specifically, we consider the standard RBC models in which government
consumption spending does not directly affect household preferences (that is, no government
consumption in utility), both with or without the assumption of rule-of-thumb behaviours
among some households. The estimated posterior mean of the parameters of these models are
presented in Columns 10 and 11 of Table 2.3. The results show that all common parameters
across the various specifications are qualitatively similar, except for the coefficient of relative risk
aversion (CRRA) which is slightly larger in models with no government in utility. Surprisingly,
the Bayes factor is relatively indifferent between the richer models with more parameters, as
reported in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2.2, and the corresponding parsimonious models with no
government-in-utility.
Furthermore, the baseline model is re-estimated on an extended dataset that covers the
period of fiscal consolidation in the UK after the financial crisis, that is, 1987:Q1-2015:Q3.
The aim of this analysis is to check whether the estimated parameters are sensitive to the
data sample. The result of this exercise is reported in Column 12 of Table 2.3 and they are
directly comparable to the baseline results, save for slight differences in the CRRA and fiscal
rule parameters. This suggests that the estimated parameters of our baseline model are robust
to data sample and relatively stable over time. It is worth noting that the log data density of
the model with extended data is not directly comparable to that of the baseline model since
the two results are not obtained from the same data distribution.
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2.5 Conclusion
Motivated by the recent trends of consolidation policies across Europe after the global financial
crisis, this paper examines the effect of government debt financing strategies on the macroe-
conomy and its interaction with the degree of household’s financial constraints. Building on
the neoclassical growth model of Leeper, Plante & Traum (2010), we develop a business cycle
model which features real frictions, such as rule-of-thumb behaviours to capture the degree of
financial constraints among households, habit formation that accounts for the role of permanent
consumption, investment adjustments costs, and a robust fiscal sector in which government con-
sumption spending directly influences households’ preference decisions and government transfers
have distortionary effects. The model includes nine (four structural and five fiscal) shocks and
is estimated on nine quarterly UK time series using Bayesian methods.
Three lessons stand out from our analysis:
1. Different types of households respond differently to fiscal policy shocks. Irrespective of
the choice of debt-consolidation strategy, financially constrained households consume less
while working more, compared to the unconstrained households. This implies that gov-
ernment’s policies aimed at deleveraging public debt do not affect all households equally;
hence, fiscal policy analyses based on representative agent models need to be reassessed.
Also, based on our results, the common assertion among policy makers that “we are all
in this together” can not be substantiated.
2. The degree of household’s financial constraints plays a significant role in fiscal policy
transmission and the achievement of debt consolidation. Specifically, the adjustments
of fiscal instruments to government debt become weaker as the proportion of financially
constrained households increases. This implies that the achievement of government con-
solidation targets becomes prolonged as household’s financial constraints intensify.
3. The choice of fiscal instrument mix influences the dynamic response of macroeconomic
variables to debt innovations, and this has implications for the achievement of debt con-
solidation. Our results favour models in which the government adopts a mix of spending
cuts and tax hikes, compared to models with only spending cuts or only tax hikes.
In conclusion, this paper shows that the responses of different types of households to fiscal
consolidation shocks vary considerably, depending on the degree of financial constraints they
face; and this, in turn, affects the overall debt-consolidation plan of the government. Therefore,
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to achieve a growth-consistent debt consolidation plan, government should be cautious in imple-
menting stringent fiscal policies. Rather than implementing a universal policy, which may hurt
the economy, the government should selectively target distinct economic sectors and consumer
groups that are less sensitive to specific fiscal instruments. Given the implications of our results
that the income of financially constrained households falls more following fiscal consolidation,
government should provide easier access to credit for financially constrained families.
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I: Linearised Solution of the Model
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II: Steady State Derivation
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III: Parameter Identification Check
Identification strength with asymptotic Information matrix (log-scale)
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Sensitivity component with asymptotic Information matrix (log-scale)
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Figure 2.11: Identification Strength of Prior Mean
Notes: This figure shows the identification strength of the estimated parameters of the baseline
model. The upper panel shows the identification strength of the parameters based on the
Fischer information matrix normalized by either the parameter at the prior mean (blue bars)
or by the standard deviation at the prior mean (yellow bars). The lower panel further decompose
the relative sensitivity of the model behaviour to each parameter (Pfeifer 2017, Ratto & Iskrev
2011). Evidence from this identification check shows that the estimated parameters are uniquely
identified – since their log-scale is significantly different from zero – and individually play
distinctive roles in the dynamics of the model.
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IV: Multivariate Convergence Diagnostics
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Figure 2.12: Multivariate Convergence Diagnostics
Notes: This figure reports the multivariate version of Brooks & Gelman (1998)’s convergence
diagnostics, which is based on the posterior likelihood function for all parameters rather than
individual univariate diagnostics originally proposed by Brooks & Gelman (1998). The top
panel shows the convergence diagnostics for the 80% of the posterior distribution. The blue
line depicts the 80th quantile range based on the pooled draws from all sequences, while the red
line depicts the mean interval range. Convergence is achieved when the two lines are close to
each other and stabilised across the horizon. The second and third panels portray the second
and third moments of the same statistic respectively. Given the result of the convergence
diagnostic reported here, we can conclude that the Monte Carlo Markov Chains (MCMC)
converge to unique posterior value.
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V: Prior and Posterior Distributions
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Figure 2.13: Prior and Posterior Distributions I
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Figure 2.14: Prior and Posterior Distributions II
Notes: This figure (see also 2.13) plots the prior and posterior distributions of the estimated
parameters. The grey line shows the prior density, the black line depicts the density of the
posterior distribution, while the green vertical line indicates the posterior mode. The plots
show that the posterior estimates are clearly identified.
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Chapter 3
International Fiscal Spillovers and
Asset Market Participation
3.1 Introduction
The recent global financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession of 2008–2010 have rekin-
dled policy debate on the relative importance of discretionary fiscal measures as effective
macroeconomic stabilisation tools. A new literature on the transmission of fiscal policy and the
relative importance of different fiscal measures in different regimes has emerged (Alesina et al.
2018, Ramey & Zubairy 2018, Leeper et al. 2017, Auerbach & Gorodnichenko 2016, Alesina,
Barbiero, Favero, Giavazzi & Paradisi 2015). Even so, a new number of studies have shown
that domestic fiscal policy have substantial international implications for countries with strong
links (Blanchard et al. 2016, Corsetti & Mu¨ller 2014), and the international multipliers vary
across the state of the business cycle (Auerbach & Gorodnichenko 2013).
In this paper, we examine the cross-border transmission of fiscal policy between the United
Kingdom and the Euro Area. Evidence from the UK trade statistics shows that nearly half
of total UK trade between 1999 and 2015 is with the EA (see Figure 3.1). And given that
trade is the primary channel of international transmission of fiscal policy, it is likely that EA
fiscal policy could have some implications for the UK economy. The paper also investigates the
role of household’s credit-constraint in international transmission of fiscal policy. Although a
significant number of studies have been devoted to the analysis of international transmission
of fiscal policy, relatively little is known about the implication of international exposure at the
global asset market on cross-border fiscal spillovers. This is the focus of this paper. Specifically,
we address the questions: What are the cross-border effects of fiscal policy? How do liquidity
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Figure 3.1: Ratio of UK trade with the Euro area as a percentage of total UK trade
(goods only). Source: Office for National Statistics.
conditions at the global asset market influence the transmission and propagation of fiscal policy
across borders?
To address these questions, we develop a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilib-
rium (DSGE) model and estimate it on quarterly UK and EA data using Bayesian methods.
Following Corsetti et al. (2010, 2012), we develop a model that features an incomplete asset
market which implies limited international risk-sharing across borders, a` la Kollmann (2010); an
exclusion of a fraction of households from asset markets to captures household credit-contraints,
as in Gal´ı et al. (2007) and Bilbiie (2008); and a productive fiscal sector in which government
services directly affect household preferences, as in Coenen et al. (2013). These features are of
interest to this paper as we intend to take the model to the data.
We make three contributions. First, since households are heterogeneous in nature, we enrich
the model to reflect the responses of different types of households to changes in fiscal policy.
Specifically, we allow different types of households to have different weights of public goods in
their effective consumption bundle. This helps to track agent-specific responses to fiscal policy
shocks, which are quite different from aggregate responses (Aiyagari 1994). Secondly, in the
spirit of Kliem & Kriwoluzky (2014), Corsetti et al. (2012) and Leeper, Plante & Traum (2010),
we propose a new set of fiscal rules for both economies, which are close to the actual fiscal policy
being implemented in these countries. The estimated parameters of the proposed fiscal rule are
also uniquely identified with flexibility, compared to other fiscal rules found in the literature.
Finally, we show through analytical derivations that relative participation at the global asset
market is a key driver of cross-country spillovers via its effects on countries’ net foreign asset
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position.
Simulation results based on the estimated model show that fiscal spillovers from the EA
have significant effects on economic activities in the UK, while UK fiscal policy have negligible
effects on the EA economy. This result is driven by the strong trade linkage between the EA and
the UK, and the relatively small size of the UK economy. Also, the magnitude and sign of these
spillover effects strongly depend on the choice of fiscal instrument employed. While spending-
based fiscal spillovers tend to have strong pro-cyclical effects, tax-based fiscal spillover effects are
relatively small and sometimes countercyclical. Given the insight derived from the analytical
solution of the model, we extend the simulation exercise to involve varying degrees of household
credit-constraints in the source country, in order to ascertain how relative participation at the
global asset market influences international fiscal spillovers. The result shows that changes in
the source country’s relative participation at the global asset market drive the propagation and
amplification effects of cross-border fiscal spillover; but the amplification mechanisms vary for
different types of households. Holders of internationally-traded assets respond within the same
year to this change as they are likely to receive the news much earlier, thereby adjusting their
asset portfolios accordingly. Whereas, non-asset holders respond to the change mainly in the
medium-run.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 3.2, we briefly review related
literature, while in Section 3.3, we describe the model of interest for the analysis. In Section
3.4, we briefly describe the estimation procedure and the data. We also discuss the calibration
of some model parameters not estimated, as well as the assigned prior and posterior estimates
of the estimated parameters. Section 3.5 discusses the simulated impulse responses based on
the estimated model and the sensitivity of the result to changes in relative participation at the
global market. Section 3.6 summarises the findings of the paper and concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
According to received wisdom, trade is the primary channel of cross-border fiscal policy trans-
mission. Changes in domestic fiscal policy transmit across borders by affecting the demand
for foreign goods and services via changes in income (demand effect), as well as the country’s
relative terms of trade via changes in import and export flows (competitiveness effect). Alterna-
tively, a fiscal shock could be transmitted across border via its effect on sovereign risk premium
and financial market confidence. This is known as the financial or interest rate channel. The
risk premium affects the global interest rate parity, and since financial markets are globally in-
47
tegrated, this affects the movement of assets across countries and influences the relative terms
of trade (Canova et al. 2013, D’Auria et al. 2014).
The standard Keynesian theory, based on the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch framework, sug-
gests that fiscal innovations which deteriorate the government’s budget position also worsen
the external balance of the economy (Arin & Koray 2009, Born et al. 2013) – hence, the name
twin-deficit hypothesis. More recently, studies have developed more sophisticated models, such
as the dynamic general equilibrium models, to analyse the transmission of fiscal innovations
domestically and across borders. Analytical results based on these models differ considerably
across studies due to a complexity of factors considered and assumptions made about the
economy being modelled. Some of these factors and assumptions include: the choice of fiscal
instruments (Erceg & Linde´ 2013), exchange rate regime (Born et al. 2013), the degree of open-
ness and size of the country (Sutherland 2005), market frictions among others (Blanchard et al.
2016, Corsetti et al. 2012, 2013, Corsetti & Mu¨ller 2014).
Corsetti et al. (2010, 2012) analyse fiscal spillovers with spending reversal within a two-
country New Keynesian model while allowing for some country-specific characteristics such
as trade elasticities, country size, degree of openness and imperfections in financial markets.
They find that anticipated fiscal expansions with spending reversal have positive cross-border
spillover effects mainly through the interest-rate channel. This result is further confirmed by
Forni et al. (2010) who find that fiscal spillovers from Germany and Belgium have expansionary
effects on the rest of the Euro area in a calibrated two-country model. In contrast, Gadatsch
et al. (2016) find that German fiscal stimulus during the financial crisis has small or negative
spillover effects on the rest of the Euro area in an estimated three-country DSGE model of
Germany, the Euro area and the rest of the world.
Arce et al. (2016), Blanchard et al. (2016) and Be´nassy-Que´re´ (2006) examine the transmis-
sion of fiscal spillovers within a monetary union (core versus peripheral entities) and observe
that its net effects (domestic plus cross-border spillovers) strongly depend on the extent of
monetary responsiveness and accommodativeness. Using a New Keynesian model of a currency
union, Blanchard et al. (2016) show that when there is no liquidity trap, the spillover effects
of expansion in core government spending on periphery output tend to be small or even neg-
ative, which is due to a rise in the common real interest rate which erodes the competitive
gains from depreciation of the periphery’s terms of trade. Whereas, when there is a liquidity
trap, periphery output tends to rise in response to core fiscal expansion since the common
interest rate is barely responsive, and the magnitude of this response is directly proportional
to the expected duration of the liquidity trap and inversely to the degree of home-bias in core
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government spending bundles.
Another strand of the literature empirically examined the international spillover effects of
domestic fiscal policy within an structural VAR framework. Carmignani (2015) estimate the
effect of United States government spending on economic activities of other OECD countries
and finds that, on average, US government expenditure has positive international multiplier
effects, but the size of the spillover effects vary across trade links, proximity and time. Similarly,
in a panel analysis of 14 EU countries, Beetsma & Giuliodori (2011) and Beetsma et al. (2006)
find that fiscal expansions in large EU countries, such as Germany, France and the UK, have
significant positive spillover effects on output and exports of the rest-of-EU countries. In
contrast, Arin & Koray (2009) find that an expansion in the US government spending has a
negative spillover effect on Canadian output. Arin et al. (2012) also find that a positive shock
to Australian government spending crowds-out real activity in New Zealand, both in the short
and medium runs.
Some empirical studies also analyse the international implications of fiscal policy for several
European countries within a Global VAR (GVAR) framework. Hebous & Zimmermann (2013)
estimate the effects of coordinated fiscal actions in the Euro Area and find that an area-wide
fiscal shock (a weighted-average for member-countries) has a sizeable effect on output com-
pared to a domestic shock. Caporale & Girardi (2013) analyse the effect of fiscal imbalance
in specific Euro member state on borrowing costs of the rest of Euro countries and find that
government yields denominated in euro have strong links with each other, but financial mar-
kets are able to discriminate among different users. Dragomirescu-Gaina & Philippas (2015)
analyse the strategic interaction of fiscal policies of 12 EU member-states by modelling the
interdependencies public and private sector’s saving-investment balances. The result of their
analysis show that cross-border private capital flows can the policy options available to the
government and worsen the tradeoff between policy responses to domestic shocks relative to
foreign shocks. Some other studies, such as Bettendorf & Leo´n-Ledesma (2018), Georgiadis
(2015), Dees et al. (2007) and Hashem Pesaran et al. (2007), also apply the GVAR framework
to analyse the international connectedness of monetary policy, financial markets, wages and
trade among Euro countries.
Finally, in a study that employed Smooth Transition VAR to estimate the effects of cross-
border output spillovers over the business cycle in a panel of OECD countries, Auerbach &
Gorodnichenko (2013) find that fiscal spillovers are statistically and economically significant,
and considerably vary over the business cycle. The spillover effects are observed to be sub-
stantially higher during recessions than in expansions, especially when both the source and
49
recipient countries are in recession.
3.3 The Model
To analyse the domestic and cross-border spillover effects of fiscal consolidation, we consider a
variant of the two-country DSGE model developed by Corsetti et al. (2010, 2012). For simplicity
and tractability, we follow the path of Leeper, Plante & Traum (2010) and Leeper, Walker &
Yang (2010) by abstrating from nominal rigidities. But, to bring the model a bit closer to reality,
we incorporate some real frictions, including: exclusion of a fraction of households from financial
markets to capture financial frictions in the asset markets, as in Gal´ı et al. (2007) and Bilbiie
(2008); debt-elastic interest rate premium which captures financial friction at the international
asset market, as in Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe (2003); incomplete international financial markets
which imply limited international risk-sharing, as in Kollmann (2012); investment adjustment
costs to control for costly acquisition of capital goods, as in Christiano et al. (2005); and habit
formation in consumption to control for the influence of permanent consumption. More so, we
allow for variations in country characteristics such as relative country sizes and composition
of final goods. Finally, we propose new set of fiscal policy rules for both countries which
follow closely that of Corsetti et al. (2012) where fiscal spending adjusts to government debt
with reversal, augmented with the tax rule proposed by Kliem & Kriwoluzky (2014) in which
income taxes respond to the employment or investment component of the business cycle.
3.3.1 Households
In each country, there is a continuum of households, indexed with i ∈ [0, 1], which comprises two
groups. The first group, indexed with r ∈ [λ, 1], owns the domestic intermediate-good firms and
trades state-contingent securities at the national and international level. As a result, this type
of household is capable of smoothing consumption across time – intertemporal optimisation.
They are referred to as “asset-holders” or Ricardian households. The second group, indexed
with h ∈ [0, λ], does not participate in asset markets. Rather, these households simply consume
their labour income in the current period – intratemporal optimisation. Hence, they are referred
to as “non-asset holders” or rule-of-thumb consumers.
Households have separable preferences which depend on the utility derived from their effec-
tive consumption, C˜it , and the disutility from labour effort, N
i
t . The effective consumption of
household-i, i = (r, h), is a non-separable CES aggregator of household-specific consumption,
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Cit , and government services, Gt, given by:
C˜it =
[
(1− %i)
1
ϕCit
ϕ−1
ϕ + %
1
ϕ
i Gt
ϕ−1
ϕ
] ϕ
ϕ−1
(3.1)
where %i ∈ (0, 1) is the share of government service in household-i’s effective consumption
bundle, and ϕ ∈ (0,∞) is the CES substitution elasticity between public and private con-
sumption goods. This specification is particularly of interest because the non-separability of
government consumption in household utility implies that public consumption spending directly
affect household preferences. One way this paper differ from existing literature with similar
specification, such as Coenen et al. (2013), is that it allows the share of public goods in house-
holds’ effective consumption bundle, %, to vary across households; since, in reality, households
considerably differ in their valuation of public goods and the weight they place on them.1
The life-time utility of households in each country is given by the following expression:
Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt+j
[
(C˜it+j − κC˜it+j−1)1−θ
1− θ −
N it+j
1+η
1 + η
]}
(3.2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, θ is the relative risk aversion rate which is
the inverse of intertemporal substitution elasticity, η is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour
supply which measures the response of labour hours to changes in after-tax wage, and κ ∈ (0, 1)
is the within-group habit parameter. This expression shows that households’ utility preference
positively depends on the difference between individual households’ current consumption, C˜it ,
and own-group past consumption level, C˜it−1, and negatively on labour hours, N
i
t .
Asset Holding Households
The asset-holding (Ricardian) households maximise lifetime utility subject to the following
budget constraint:
(1 + τ ct )C
r
t + I
r
t +
PH,t
Pt
BrH,t +
PF,t
Pt
DrF,t = (1− τwt )WtN rt + [RktUt]Krt−1
+
PH,t
Pt
Rt−1BrH,t−1 +
PF,t
Pt
R∗t−1D
r
F,t−1Φ
d
t−1 + Π
r
t + Z
r
t (3.3)
Asset holders choose consumption, Crt , and labour services, N
r
t , that maximises their utility.
They supply their labour services to the intermediate-good firms for a real wage, Wt. They
1For instance, low-income households depend more on government resources, such as education and health-
care services, compared to high-income households who can afford provision of such basic needs.
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also invest, Irt , in capital goods, K
r
t , which is rented to intermediate-good firms at a real cost
Rkt , and hold one-period domestic and foreign government bonds, B
r
H,t and D
r
F,t respectively. It
is assumed that, while asset-holders in home country trade both home and foreign government
bonds, foreign asset-holders trade only foreign government bonds. Rt and R
∗
t are the gross real
return on domestic and foreign government bond,
PH,t
Pt
and
PF,t
Pt
are the relative prices of home
and foreign goods respectively, Πrt is profit from ownership of intermediate-good firms, and Z
r
t
is the government transfer receipt.
Following Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe (2003), Φdt is the debt-elastic interest rate premium which
ensures that foreign debt level is stationary in a log-linear approximation to the model, and it
is given by:
Φdt = e
−φd(
PF,t
Pt
DF,t−DF )/Y ∗ (3.4)
where φd is the premium’s elasticity with respect to foreign bonds issued in units of foreign
output, Y ∗. One interesting feature about this specification of interest rate premium is that, at
steady state, domestic interest rate converges to foreign interest rate. Hence, no country can
continually borrow in perpetuity.
The capital accumulation process follow closely that of Christiano et al. (2005) which as-
sumed a costly adjustment to investment:
Krt = (1− δ(Ut))Krt−1 + Φk
(
Irt
Irt−1
)
εIt I
r
t (3.5)
where Φk
(
Irt
Irt−1
)
= 1 − φk
2
(
Irt
Irt−1
− 1
)2
is the investment adjustment costs while φk is the ad-
justment costs parameter. εIt is an investment-specific shock which follows an AR(1) process,
such that εˆIt = ρI εˆ
I
t−1 + ˆ
I
t , where ˆ
I
t ∼ NIID(0, σI) is a pure random error to investment. The
non-negative depreciation function closely follows the one analysed in Greenwood et al. (1988),
and it is given by:
δ(Ut) = δU
1+ξ
t (3.6)
where δ(.) satisfies: δ(.) > 0, δ′(.) > 0 and δ′′(.) > 0, implying that higher capital utilization
rates lead to faster capital stock depreciation. Ut is the capacity utilisation level, while ξ =
Uδ′′(U)
δ′(U) is the constant elasticity of utilisation rate and δ is the steady-state depreciation rate.
Non-asset Holding Households
As earlier discussed above, non-asset holding households in each country simply live from
“hand to mouth” by consuming their current disposable income in each period, augmented
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with government transfers. Therefore, the non-asset holding households maximise a single-
period utility subject to the following budget constraint:
(1 + τ ct )C
h
t = (1− τwt )WtNht + Zht (3.7)
where Cht and N
h
t are the consumption and labour services of non-asset holding households.
Also, it is assumed that there is no discrimination in the labour market. Hence, all households
are paid similar real wage. τ ct and τ
w
t are taxes on consumption and income respectively, and
Zht is the government transfer to the household. It is assumed that the government does not
discriminate among households in the allocation of social transfers, hence Zt = Z
r
t = Z
h
t . The
aggregate private consumption, hours, investment, capital, domestic and foreign government
bonds and profit are given as:
Ct = (1− λ)Crt + λCht (3.8)
Nt = (1− λ)N rt + λNht (3.9)
It = (1− λ)Irt (3.10)
Kt = (1− λ)Krt (3.11)
BH,t = (1− λ)BrH,t (3.12)
DF,t = (1− λ)DrF,t (3.13)
Πt = (1− λ)Πrt (3.14)
3.3.2 Firms
There are two types of firms in this economy: the final-goods producers and the intermediate
goods producers.
Final Good Firms
Final-good firms operate in perfect competitive markets. They produce final goods for imme-
diate consumption within the domestic economy. Final goods, Xt = (Ct, It, Gt), are produced
using a CES aggregator of domestically produced and imported intermediate goods given by:
Xt =
[
ν
1
σX
σ−1
σ
H,t + (1− ν)
1
σX
σ−1
σ
F,t
] σ
σ−1
(3.15)
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which is maximised subject to a cost outlay given by
PtXt = PH,tXH,t + PF,tXF,t (3.16)
where XH,t are domestically produced home intermediate goods, XF,t are the imported foreign
intermediate goods, PH,t is the price of a unit of home-produced goods and PF,t is the price of
a unit of foreign goods. ν ∈ (0, 1) is the share of home goods in the aggregate bundle which
measures the degree of home bias, while σ ∈ (0,∞) is the CES elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods. By substituting the optimal value of intermediate goods produced
domestically and imported into the cost outlay, the equation for the aggregate price index can
be obtained as
Pt =
[
νP 1−σH,t + (1− ν)P 1−σF,t
] 1
1−σ (3.17)
It is worth noting that, with this specification, the government is assumed to consume a com-
bination of both home and foreign goods. We have used this CES specification for all agents
so as to achieve aggregation.
Intermediate Good Firms
Like the final-good firms, intermediate-good firms operate in a competitive market. They rent
capital from the asset-holders at a real cost, Rkt , and employ labour from the households at a
universal real wage, Wt, since they do not discriminate between labour services of households.
Capital and labour are assumed to be immobile internationally but can be adjusted freely in
each period within a country. Output, Yt, is produced using a CES technology given by:
Yt = ε
A
t (UtKt−1)
αN1−αt (3.18)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the share of capital, and εAt is the technology shock in the home country.
The firms maximise a profit function given by the expression:
Πt =
PH,t
Pt
Yt −WtNt −RktUtKt−1 (3.19)
subject to the CES production technology, where
PH,t
Pt
is the relative price of home goods.
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3.3.3 Fiscal Authority
In each period, the government decides on a set of fiscal instruments that satisfy its current
budget constraint which evolves according to the following law of motion:
PH,t
Pt
Bt =
PH,t
Pt
Rt−1Bt−1 + [Gt + Zt − τ ctCt − τwt WtNt] (3.20)
where Bt is the total amount of bond issued by the home government which is denominated in
domestic currency. Since it is assumed that home government bond is held by only domestic
households, Bt = BH,t. On the other hand, the foreign government bond is held by both home
and foreign asset holders. Hence, from the foreign government’s perspective, the total amount
of bonds issued,B∗t , is equal to the amount held within the domestic economy, B
∗
F,t and the
amount traded internationally, D∗F,t:
B∗t = B
∗
F,t +D
∗
F,t (3.21)
In this model, it is assumed that both countries follow similar fiscal rules. For the purpose
of this analysis, we propose a set of fiscal rules which closely follow that of Leeper, Plante
& Traum (2010), Corsetti et al. (2012) and Kliem & Kriwoluzky (2014). For spending rules,
it is assumed that (stochastic) fiscal spending ratios (government consumption and transfers)
respond to government debt ratio with feedback, as in Corsetti et al. (2012):
Gt
Yt
=
(
Bt−1
Yt
)−ςg (Gt−1
Yt−1
)ρg
e
g
t (3.22)
Zt
Yt
=
(
Bt−1
Yt
)−ςz (Zt−1
Yt−1
)ρz
e
z
t (3.23)
For the tax rule, it is assumed that consumption and income taxes respond to the level of debt
and income tax further responds to contemporaneous investment as in Kliem & Kriwoluzky
(2014):2
2Kliem & Kriwoluzky (2014) observed that when the conventional debt feedback rule for income taxes, which
is based on cyclical movements with contemporaneous output, are estimated, the feedback parameters are not
statistically different from zero and/or may not be identified. But when income taxes are allowed to adjust
to labour hours and capital, the feedback parameters are identified and statistically significantly different from
zero. Hence, they proposed that the cyclical movements of labour and capital income tax rates should be
described by a contemporaneous response to hours worked and/or investment.
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τ ct = B
ςτc
t−1ε
τc
t (ε
τw
t )
ιτ ; ετct =
(
ετct−1
)ρτc
e
τc
t (3.24)
τwt = B
ςτw
t−1I
ϑτw
t ε
τw
t (ε
τc
t )
ιτ ; ετwt =
(
ετwt−1
)ρτw eτwt (3.25)
where ςx, for x ∈ (g, z, τ c, τw), are the fiscal adjustment parameters to government debt, ρg
and ρz are the spending feedback parameters, ϑτw is the response of income tax to contempo-
raneous investment, ρτc and ρτw are the persistence parameters of tax shocks, while ιτ is the
cross-correlation parameter of contemporaneous shocks to consumption and income taxes as in
Leeper, Plante & Traum (2010), and xt ∼ NIID(0, σx) are the unanticipated fiscal shocks.
The nested fiscal rules in this model are relatively better compared to those in the existing
literature for two reasons: first, unlike Leeper, Plante & Traum (2010) which allows fiscal
instruments to adjust to contemporaneous output, our fiscal rule does not pre-empt the cyclical
movement of output in response to estimated shock prior to estimation. Rather, within the
spending rule, output response depends on a linear combination of the debt-adjustment and
feedback parameters, while within the tax rule, it depends on the tax role within the model
framework. Second, the specified spending rule is more flexible to work with, in the sense that it
can be estimated with variables in ratio or level form with consistent and identified parameters.
3.3.4 Goods Market Equilibrium
The goods market clears when the aggregate supply equals absorption. The market clearing
conditions for both home and foreign produced output are given by:
Yt = CH,t + IH,t +GH,t + C
∗
H,t + I
∗
H,t +G
∗
H,t (3.26)
Y ∗t = CF,t + IF,t +GF,t + C
∗
F,t + I
∗
F,t +G
∗
F,t (3.27)
3.3.5 Foreign Country Block and International Linkages
The foreign country set-up is analogous to that of the home country, except that foreign house-
holds do not trade assets internationally. The foreign country’s final-good aggregator, the cost
of producing it and the resulting aggregate price index are given as follow:
X∗t =
[
ν∗
1
σX∗H,t
σ−1
σ + (1− ν∗) 1σX∗F,t
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
(3.28)
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P ∗t X
∗
t = P
∗
H,tX
∗
H,t + P
∗
F,tX
∗
F,t (3.29)
P ∗t =
[
ν∗P ∗H,t
1−σ + (1− ν∗)P ∗F,t1−σ
] 1
1−σ (3.30)
where starred variables are foreign prices and quantities and ν∗ is the share of home goods
in the foreign basket. From the perspective of the home country, the terms of trade can be
expressed as:
Tt =
PF,t
P ∗H,t
(3.31)
However, if the principle of purchasing power parity (PPP) holds,3 such that PH,t = P
∗
H,t, then:
Tt =
PF,t
PH,t
(3.32)
Therefore, we can express the relative prices of home- and foreign-produced goods as a function
of the terms of trade:
PH,t
Pt
= [ν + (1− ν)T 1−σt ]−
1
1−σ (3.33)
PF,t
Pt
= [νT
−(1−σ)
t + (1− ν)]−
1
1−σ (3.34)
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
= [ν∗ + (1− ν∗)T 1−σt ]−
1
1−σ (3.35)
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
= [ν∗T−(1−σ)t + (1− ν∗)]−
1
1−σ (3.36)
while the real exchange rate, which is the ratio of foreign aggregate price to domestic aggregate
price, can as well be expressed as a function of the terms of trade:
RX =
P ∗t
Pt
=
[
ν∗ + (1− ν∗)T 1−σt
ν + (1− ν)T 1−σt
] 1
1−σ
(3.37)
For the foreign country’s intermediate-good firms, their analogous profit and production
functions are given as:
Π∗t =
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
Y ∗t −W ∗t N∗t −Rk∗t K∗t−1 (3.38)
Y ∗t = ε
A∗
t (U
∗
tK
∗
t−1)
α∗N∗t
1−α∗ (3.39)
Following Baxter & Crucini (1993) and Baxter & Farr (2005), the exogenous process for
productivity shocks, expressed in percentage deviation from steady state, is assumed to follow
3Otherwise known as the law of one price (LOOP).
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a stationary process specified as a bivariate VAR(1):
 εˆAt
εˆA
∗
t
 =
ρa ι
ι ρ∗a
 εˆAt−1
εˆA
∗
t−1
+
 at
a∗t
 (3.40)
The innovations to productivity process have zero mean, E(at ) = E(
a∗
t ) = 0, and a variance-
covariance matrix given by:
E(at , 
a∗
t )(
a
t , 
a∗
t )
′ =
σ2a 0
0 σ2a∗
 (3.41)
where ρa and ρ
∗
a are the persistence parameters, ι is the diffusion parameter which captures
how innovations to productivity are transmitted from one country to another, while σ2a and σ
∗
a
2
are the variances of technology shocks.
International Financial Markets
The internationally traded part of the foreign government bond has a zero net supply, such
that:
PF,t
Pt
DF,t +
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
D∗F,t = 0 (3.42)
Given that the law of one price holds, it can be shown that:
D∗F,t = −
P ∗t
Pt
DF,t (3.43)
Substituting this identity into the expression for total foreign government bond, taking into
account the aggregate definition for DF,t and an analogous aggregate definition for B
∗
F,t =
(1− λ∗)B∗rF,t, we obtain:
B∗t = (1− λ∗)Br∗F,t − (1− λ)
P ∗t
Pt
DrF,t (3.44)
where λ∗ denotes the proportion of asset holders in the foreign economy. Applying the implicit
theorem to this expression, it can be shown that:
dDrF,t
dBr∗F,t
= − ∂B
∗
t
∂Br∗F,t
/
∂B∗t
∂DrF,t
= − 1− λ
∗
−(1− λ)P ∗t
Pt
(3.45)
Dividing the expression on the left hand size by the respective steady-state output gives:
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dDrF,t
Y
(
Y
Y ∗
)
÷ dB
r∗
F,t
Y ∗
=
(
1− λ∗
1− λ
)(
P ∗t
Pt
)−1
(3.46)
∴
DˆrF,t
Bˆr∗F,t
=
(
1− n
n
)(
1− λ∗
1− λ
)(
P ∗t
Pt
)−1
(3.47)
where, DˆrF,t and Bˆ
r∗
F,t are the capital account balances of the home and foreign countries respec-
tively,
P ∗t
Pt
is the real exchange rate, and n = Y
Y+Y ∗ is the relative size of the home country. This
expression shows a number of factors influencing a country’s relative net asset position at the
global financial market. It simply states that the relative net asset position of an economy does
not only depend on country characteristics – such as the relative country size and the exchange
rate regime, but also driven by the relative degree of participation at the international asset
market, as reflected in the relative size of the asset holders across economies. The implica-
tion of this derived result is that the degree of exposure at the global asset market could have
important implications for cross-country policy spillovers.
Nesting all constraints by different agents and taking into consideration the first order
optimization choices of both households and firms, the current account balance of the home
country is obtained as
PF,t
Pt
(DF,t −DF,t−1) =
[
PH,t
Pt
Yt − Ct −Gt − It
]
+
PF,t
Pt
DF,t−1(R∗t−1Φ
d
t−1 − 1) (3.48)
This equation simply states that the current account balance is equal to (national) savings less
investment plus the net foreign asset income. Alternatively, the net foreign asset position can
be expressed in terms of the trade balance by substituting the goods market equilibrium into
the above equation to obtain:
(DF,t −DF,t−1) =
[
1
Tt
(C∗H,t + I
∗
H,t +G
∗
H,t)− (CF,t + IF,t +GF,t)
]
+(R∗t−1Φ
d
t−1 − 1)DF,t−1 (3.49)
which simply states that the net foreign asset position of an economy is the sum of its trade
balance (exports less imports, as shown in the first term on the RHS of the equation) and
interest income on foreign asset.
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3.4 Estimation
The procedure for the model evaluation involves three steps. First, we solve for optimal choices
of households and firms. Then, we generate a system of equations by combining the agents’
optimal choices with constraints and equilibrium conditions in the model. In the second step,
we generate the steady-state conditions for the system of equations and log-linearise each equa-
tion relative to the steady-state conditions. This procedure allows variable responses to be
interpreted as percentage deviations from steady-state. Finally, the third step involves the es-
timation of the model using Bayesian technique as described by An & Schorfheide (2007). This
technique involves specifying prior distributions for the non-calibrated parameters of the model
and obtaining the posterior distributions of the estimated parameters based on the state-space
representation of the log-linearised approximation of the model using Kalman filter.
Let the prior distribution of the parameter vector θ ∈ Θ for some model m ∈M be P (θ|m),
and let the likelihood function of the observed data XT = {xt}Tt=1 be defined as L(XT |θ,m),
which is conditional on the parameter vector θ and the model m. The computation of the
likelihood starts from the solution to the log-linear state-space representation of the model
using Kalman filter. The computed likelihood function for the data can then be combined with
the prior distribution to obtain the posterior distribution of the estimated parameters, given
as:
P (θ|XT ,m) ∝ L(XT |θ,m)P (θ|m) (3.50)
The posterior mode can be obtained by numerically maximizing P (θ|XT ,m). To obtain the
posterior distribution, the Metropolis-Hasting (MH) algorithm is then initiated based on some
Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) draws, with some draws discarded in the burn-in phase.
The model estimation is carried out in Matlab using Dynare interface. The rest of this
section describes the observed data, parameter calibration, prior and posterior distributions of
estimated parameters.
3.4.1 Data
In order to estimate the model described above, we use a set of 6 variables each for the United
Kingdom and the aggregate Euro area respectively over the sample period 1999:Q1-2015:Q4 (68
observations): private consumption, investment, total labour hours, government consumption
spending, consumption tax revenue and government debt. We have used 12 variables here since
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Figure 3.2: The observed variables (1999Q1-2015Q4).
Notes: This figure shows the one-sided HP-filtered time series used in the estimation of the model.
there are 12 structural shocks (6 for each country) in the model. The choice of these selected
variables is informed by the identification of key structural shocks and deep parameters of
interest in the model. For instance, while the observed series on government consumption
spending is targeted at identifying government spending shocks in the fiscal rule, government
debt is aimed at identifying the share of asset holders in each country, and the net surplus/deficit
of private and public demands between the two countries is to help identify the trade elasticity
between home and foreign goods.
The data series are obtained from the Eurostat online database. The aggregate Euro area
data employed for this analysis is the composite of the 19 members of the monetary union as
of 2015. In comparison, Gadatsch et al. (2016) used aggregates of the 8 largest members of
the union only, which is just a subset of the initial EMU-11 countries. All the variables are
converted to real values using their respective constant price deflators, and further converted
to per capita values using the respective population of the country/region.4 The data series
are detrended using the one-sided HP-filter, and the filtered series are further demeaned as
suggested by Pfeifer (2018).
Figure 3.2 plots the stochastically de-trended time series of the observed variables used in the
estimation of the benchmark model. From this plot, it can be observed that, while government
4Most of the studies in the literature have used the active population as the per capita deflator, but we
have used the total population here as we could not have access to the aggregate Euro area active population.
However, our approach is still much better than using the variables in levels as noted in Pfeifer (2018).
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Table 3.1: Calibration of selected parameters and key steady state ratios
Parameter/Target Variables
Value Comment
UK EA
Preference
Subjective discount factor β, β∗ 0.995 0.995 Annualised real interest rate of 2% in EA
Govt share in Ric cons. bundle %r, %∗r 0.2112 0.2552 Computed as: %r =
G
Cr+G
Govt share in ROT cons. bundle %h, %
∗
h 0.2657 0.2917 Computed as: %h =
G
Ch+G
.
Technology
Capital share α, α∗ 0.30 0.30 One-third of income (See Coenen et al. (2013))
Depreciation rate δ, δ∗ 0.015 0.015 6% at annualised rate Coenen et al. (2013)
International sector
Foreign debt elasticity φd 0.01 See Bouakez & Eyquem (2015)
Foreign debt DF
Y
0.00
Target Steady state variables
Government consumption ratio G
Y
, G
∗
Y ∗ 0.1898 0.2069 Eurostat database
Government transfer ratio Z
Y
, Z
∗
Y ∗ 0.1268 0.1639 Eurostat database
Government debt ratio B
4Y
, B
∗
4Y ∗ 0.5433 0.7605 Eurostat database
Consumption tax τc, τc∗ 0.1755 0.1981 Computed as ratio of cons. tax rev. to priv. cons.
Income tax τw, τw∗ 0.3001 0.3743 Calibrated from the model
Relative size of home country n, 1− n 0.1430 0.857 Eurostat database. n = Y
Y+Y ∗
Imports share in consumption (1− ν), ν∗ 0.2095 0.0408 Eurostat database.
Notes: This table presents the calibrated values of selected parameters and key steady state ratios of target
variables for our country/region of interest. In cases where a value is recorded for a parameter only under the
UK column, it implies that such parameter is an interlink parameter between the two countries but calibrated
from the UK’s perspective.
spending rose sharply during the crisis period in both countries, it fell sharply and has remained
below the trend line since 2010, which corresponds to the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis
when fiscal consolidations were initiated in these countries. The initial increase in government
spending during the crisis period led to a surge in government debt; however, since 2011,
government debt has levelled down around the trend, which corresponds to the period of fiscal
consolidation. More so, during the consolidation period, private consumption growth tends to
be lower compared to the pre-consolidation era, while labour hours tends to be higher.
3.4.2 Calibration
Table 3.1 presents the values assigned to calibrated parameters and steady state ratios of key
target variables for both countries of interest. For the calibrated structural parameters, α is
set to 0.30 as in Coenen et al. (2013), suggesting that capital income share in both countries is
about one-third; while δ is set to 0.015 as in Gadatsch et al. (2016), suggesting a 6% annualised
depreciation rate of capital; and the subjective discount factor β is set to 0.995 to hit an
annualised real interest rate of 2% for the EA.5 The elasticity of the risk premium (the bond
holding cost), ψd, is set to 0.01 as in most literature on incomplete market with limited risk-
sharing. Bouakez & Eyquem (2015) estimated ψd to be around 0.006 for the UK in a trade
5For the EA, Gadatsch et al. (2016) set β to be 0.9985 while Coenen et al. (2013) calibrated β to hit an
annualised equilibrium real interest rate of 2.5%, that is, β = 0.9938
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with the rest of the world.
Based on the assumptions made in the model, the share of public goods in households’
consumption bundle is calibrated differently for each type of household. %r and %h are cali-
brated to 0.2112 and 0.2657 for UK asset and non-asset holding households respectively, while
the figures are 0.2552 and 0.2917 respectively for their counterparts in the EA. These values
show that, while non-asset holders depend considerably more on government resources in both
countries, which is in line with our earlier argument, the share of government spending in total
final expenditure in the UK economy is relatively smaller compared to the EA.
Regarding the steady state values of key target variables as computed from the individual
statistics of each economy, government consumption spending as a ratio of nominal GDP is
about 19% for the UK and 21% for the EA, while transfer-to-GDP ratio is about 13% and 16%
respectively. This suggests that steady state aggregate government spending ratio in the EA is
about 17% points higher compared to the UK. Similarly, steady state tax rates on consumption
and income are relatively higher in the EA compared to the UK. τ c and τw are calibrated to
about 18% and 30% respectively for the UK, while for the EA, they are about 20% and 37%
respectively. Meanwhile, steady state government debt ratio (quarterly average) is about 54%
for the UK, compared to a much higher value of about 76% for the EA, while the foreign debt
is assumed to be zero at steady state.
Finally, we calibrated some useful parameters relating both economies. The relative size
of the UK economy is calibrated to about 14.3%, suggesting that the UK is relatively small
compared to the aggregate EA economy. Also, the share of imports from EA in UK’s aggregate
consumption bundle is computed to be about 21%, which is quite reasonable.
3.4.3 Prior Distribution
Table 3.2 presents the prior distributions of the estimated parameters. The select priors conform
with existing studies on the Euro area (see Gadatsch et al. (2016), Coenen et al. (2013), Forni
et al. (2010)). As it’s the norm in international business cycle studies, similar parameters in
both the UK and EA are assigned equal priors. For the relative risk aversion, (θ, θ∗), and the
inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply, (η, η∗), we assume a Gamma distribution with the
prior mean set at 1.5 and 2 respectively and standard deviation of 0.40, which are similar to
the values set by Leeper, Plante & Traum (2010). The habit formation parameter, (κ, κ∗),
is assumed to follow a Beta distribution with the mean set at 0.50 and a standard deviation
of 0.10. The elasticity of substitution between private and public goods, (ϕ, ϕ∗), is assumed
63
Table 3.2: Prior distributions and posterior estimates for baseline model
Parameter
Prior Posterior
Density Mean Std. Mode Mean [5%,95%] Std
United Kingdom
Structural
Risk aversion θ Gamma 1.50 0.40 1.978 2.022 [1.475, 2.563] 0.282
Inv Frisch elast. η Gamma 2.00 0.40 1.171 1.288 [0.876, 1.739] 0.213
Habit κ Beta 0.50 0.10 0.273 0.278 [0.159, 0.397] 0.063
Consump elast. ϕ Gamma 0.30 0.10 0.471 0.488 [0.320, 0.675] 0.086
Share of non-asset holders λ Beta 0.35 0.05 0.279 0.279 [0.215, 0.348] 0.034
Inv. adj. costs φk Normal 5.00 2.50 2.679 4.227 [1.353, 7.584] 1.414
Fiscal Rule
G resp. to B ςg Gamma 0.40 0.20 0.083 0.088 [0.030, 0.150] 0.031
Z resp. to B ςz Gamma 0.40 0.20 0.139 0.182 [0.039, 0.348] 0.077
τc resp. to B ςτc Gamma 0.40 0.20 0.167 0.185 [0.055, 0.325] 0.072
τw resp. to B ςτw Gamma 0.40 0.20 0.528 0.551 [0.294, 0.808] 0.123
τw resp. to Inv. ϑτw Gamma 0.50 0.30 0.290 0.294 [0.105, 0.493] 0.100
Cross-corr of taxes ιτ Normal 0.00 0.20 -0.131 -0.124 [-0.252, 0.006] 0.067
AR(1) Coefficients
Technology shock ρa Beta 0.50 0.20 0.447 0.462 [0.209, 0.726] 0.137
Inv-Specific Tech. shock ρi Beta 0.50 0.20 0.136 0.161 [0.025, 0.313] 0.076
Govt spending feedback ρg Beta 0.50 0.20 0.823 0.804 [0.647, 0.952] 0.083
Transfer feedback ρz Beta 0.50 0.20 0.277 0.333 [0.081, 0.594] 0.145
Consumption tax shock ρτc Beta 0.50 0.20 0.622 0.623 [0.432, 0.815] 0.097
Income tax shock ρτw Beta 0.50 0.20 0.641 0.643 [0.455, 0.829] 0.097
Std. of Shocks
Technology shock σa Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.015 0.016 [0.013, 0.019] 0.002
Inv-Specific Tech. shock σi Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.109 0.164 [0.059, 0.287] 0.052
Govt spending σg Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.018 0.019 [0.016, 0.023] 0.002
Transfer σz Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.096 0.100 [0.081, 0.121] 0.010
Consumption tax στc Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.025 0.026 [0.021, 0.030] 0.002
Income tax στw Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.027 0.029 [0.023, 0.036] 0.003
Euro Area
Structural
Risk aversion θ∗ Gamma 1.5 0.40 2.281 2.315 [1.721, 2.902] 0.302
Inv Frisch η∗ Gamma 2.0 0.40 1.549 1.571 [1.070, 2.096] 0.268
Habit κ∗ Beta 0.50 0.10 0.276 0.284 [0.173, 0.398] 0.058
Consump elast. ϕ∗ Gamma 0.30 0.10 0.394 0.413 [0.266, 0.572] 0.075
Share of non-asset holders λ∗ Beta 0.35 0.05 0.295 0.295 [0.228, 0.364] 0.035
Inv. adj. costs φ∗k Normal 5.00 2.50 5.075 6.091 [2.848, 9.587] 1.757
Fiscal Rule
G∗ resp. to B∗F ς
∗
g Gamma 0.40 0.20 0.107 0.119 [0.036, 0.207] 0.045
Z∗ resp. to B∗F ς
∗
z Gamma 0.40 0.20 0.162 0.211 [0.040, 0.409] 0.090
τc∗ resp. to B∗F ς
∗
τc Gamma 0.40 0.20 0.153 0.188 [0.045, 0.352] 0.079
τw∗ resp. to B∗F ς
∗
τw Gamma 0.40 0.20 0.798 0.797 [0.418, 1.170] 0.191
τw∗ resp to Inv. ϑ∗τw Gamma 0.50 0.30 0.218 0.253 [0.045, 0.473] 0.121
Cross-corr of taxes ι∗τ Normal 0.00 0.20 -0.218 -0.205 [-0.374, -0.031] 0.090
AR(1) Coefficients
Technology shock ρ∗a Beta 0.50 0.20 0.777 0.764 [0.608, 0.910] 0.082
Inv-Specific Tech. shock ρ∗i Beta 0.50 0.20 0.507 0.497 [0.272, 0.726] 0.117
Govt spending feedback ρ∗g Beta 0.50 0.20 0.900 0.874 [0.755, 0.982] 0.061
Transfer feedback ρ∗z Beta 0.50 0.20 0.646 0.631 [0.353, 0.891] 0.146
Consumption tax shock ρ∗τc Beta 0.50 0.20 0.803 0.793 [0.640, 0.939] 0.080
Income tax shock ρ∗τw Beta 0.50 0.20 0.738 0.739 [0.544, 0.924] 0.107
Std. of Shocks
Technology shock σ∗a Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.012 0.012 [0.012, 0.014] 0.001
Inv-Specific Tech. shock σ∗i Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.063 0.076 [0.037, 0.121] 0.020
Govt spending σ∗g Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.012 0.013 [0.012, 0.015] 0.001
Transfer σ∗z Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.047 0.049 [0.040, 0.059] 0.005
Consumption tax σ∗τc Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.015 0.016 [0.013, 0.019] 0.001
Income tax σ∗τw Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00 0.017 0.018 [0.014, 0.022] 0.002
External Block
Trade elasticity σ Gamma 1.50 0.40 1.935 2.008 [1.436, 2.609] 0.289
Technology diffusion ι Normal 0.00 0.20 0.051 0.050 [-0.059, 0.157] 0.057
Notes: This table presents the prior distributions and posterior estimates of parameters in the benchmark model
with an estimated share of non-asset holding households (ROT). The EA pameters are starred. Posterior Mean
and percentiles are from two Monte Carlo Markov Chains with 1,000,000 draws generated using a Metropolis-
Hasting random walk algorithm, where we discard 200,000 draws in the burn-in phase of each chain (i.e. 20%).
The MH step-size is sufficiently tuned up such that it resulted to an acceptance rate of about 30% which is
comfortably within the band specified in the literature (see Adjemian et al. (2011)). Finally, for convergence, we
examine the Brooks & Gelman (1998) convergence plots to ensure that the MCMC chains converge to unique
posterior value.
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to follow a Gamma distribution with a mean of 0.30 and a standard deviation of 0.10. The
share of non-asset holders, (λ, λ∗), is assumed to follow a Beta distribution with the mean set
to 0.35 and a standard deviation of 0.05, which is consistent with the range of (0, 0.50) often
estimated in the literature (see Gadatsch et al. (2016), Coenen et al. (2013) and Corsetti et al.
(2010)). The investment adjustment costs parameter, (φk, φ
∗
k), is assumed to follow a Normal
distribution with the mean set to 5 and a standard deviation of 2.5.
Regarding the fiscal adjustment parameters of government debt, (ςx, ς
∗
x), since we have
imposed sign restrictions on them within the model as in Leeper, Plante & Traum (2010), they
are assumed to have a Gamma density with a prior mean of 0.40 and a standard deviation of
0.20. More so, we assumed that the contemporaneous response of income tax to investment,
(ϑτw, ϑ
∗
τw), follows a Gamma distribution with a mean of 0.50 and a standard deviation of 0.30;
while the contemporaneous cross-correlation of consumption and income tax shocks, (ζcn, ζ
∗
cn),
is assumed to follow a Normal distribution with a zero mean and a standard deviation of 0.20.
Following Forni et al. (2010), we set the prior mean of trade elasticity between home and
foreign goods, σ, to 1.5 with a standard deviation of 0.40 on the assumption that it has a
Gamma density; whereas, the technology diffusion parameter, ι, is assumed to follow a Normal
distribution with a zero mean and a standard deviation of 0.20. Finally, the prior distributions
for the AR(1) coefficients and standard deviations of unanticipated shocks are pretty standard:
(ρx, ρ
∗
x) are assumed to follow a Beta distribution with a 0.50 mean and a standard deviation
of 0.20, while (σx, σ
∗
x) are assumed to follow an Inverse Gamma distribution with mean and
standard deviation set to 0.10 and 2 respectively.
3.4.4 Posterior Estimates
The last four columns of Table 3.2 present the posterior distribution of the estimated parameters
in the benchmark model with estimated share of non-asset holders. The table reports the
posterior mode and mean with 5 and 95 percent confidence bounds, and the standard deviation.
The posterior mode and standard deviation are obtained by maximizing the posterior kernel
using the fmincon optimization routine in Dynare (option 1). The mean and the percentile
distributions are obtained from two 1,000,000 MCMC draws, with 200,000 draws discarded in
the burn-in phase of each chain (that is, 20%). The average acceptance ratio is between 29.46%
and 29.55%, which is comfortably within the specified band in the literature (see Adjemian
et al. (2011)). Furthermore, we carry out some diagnostic checks to ensure that the estimated
parameters are uniquely identified and that the MCMC chains converge to unique posterior
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values (see the Appendix).
From the table, it can be observed that all parameters are estimated to be non-zero, except
for the technology diffusion parameter and the comovement term of consumption and income
taxes in the UK which both include zero. Comparing the domestic blocks, it can be observed
that the size of non-policy structural parameters in both countries/regions are pretty similar,
except for the investment adjustment costs (φk, φ
∗
k) which is 4.23 for the UK and 6.09 for the
Euro area. Both countries have a relatively sizeable amount of non-asset holders (λ, λ∗), roughly
between one-quarter and one-third of the population (about 28% for the UK and 30% for the
EA), which is consistent with most estimates in the literature for the economies (see Forni
et al. (2009), Coenen & Straub (2005)). More so, elasticities of substitution between public
and private goods, (ϕ, ϕ∗), are 0.49 and 0.41 at mean for the UK and EA respectively, suggesting
that both goods are moderate complements, which is similar to the finding of Coenen et al.
(2013). Furthermore, the result suggests that the parameter estimates of the AR(1) coefficients
are relatively more persistent in the EA compared to the UK, while shocks to the UK economy
are relatively more volatile compared to the EA.
Focusing on estimates of fiscal policy rules, it is observed that the response of fiscal instru-
ments to domestic government debt innovations is relatively stronger in the EA compared to
UK, especially for income taxes which have the highest response.6 Also, the result shows that
income taxes have sizeable procyclical movement with investment in both countries, suggesting
that an increase in investment, hence output, could lead to a rise in income tax rate. Our
fiscal adjustment estimates are comparable to studies on fiscal policy in Europe. For instance,
Coenen et al. (2013) estimated government spending adjustment parameter to be -0.02, and
-0.14 for transfer, which are a bit less than our estimates; while Forni et al. (2009) estimated
labour income tax adjustment to be 0.28 at mean, and 0.50 for consumption tax adjustment.7
Finally, the contemporaneous correlation between consumption and income taxes is estimated
to be negative for both countries, suggesting that adjustments on one tax may affect the other,
at least in the Euro area where the comovement term is statistically different from zero. Shocks
to government transfers tend to be relatively more volatile compared to other fiscal shocks in
both countries.
Regarding the parameters of international linkages, evidence from our result points to the
6It is worth noting that all fiscal adjustment parameters are estimated to be positive since we have already
imposed sign restrictions on them in the model
7Note that the Forni et al. (2009) model also includes taxes on capital with the adjustment parameter
estimated to be 0.57. This may account for the low estimate of labour income tax adjustment in their model
compared to our model with zero capital tax.
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fact that home and foreign goods are substitutes with the trade elasticity, σ ∈ (1.44, 2.61),
estimated to be significantly greater than one. This value is validly within the range of 0.66
to 3 suggested by Corsetti et al. (2010), and the range of 0.1 to 2 surveyed by Corsetti et al.
(2008). However, this result is in contrast with the finding of Justiniano & Preston (2010) who
estimated a median trade elasticity value of 0.86 for US trade with Canada, suggesting that
home and foreign goods are weakly complementary. Also, Gadatsch et al. (2016) estimated a
trade elasticity of 0.97 at mean for German trade with the rest of the Euro area, suggesting
that final-goods firms have a near Cobb-Douglas technology. Finally, the technology diffusion
parameter in the productivity transition matrix is estimated to be around 0.05 at mean, which
is higher than a value of 0.025 estimated by Heathcote & Perri (2002) for the US trade with
the rest of the world.
3.5 Impulse Responses
This section discusses the impulse responses of estimated fiscal shocks in the linearised bench-
mark model. The impulse responses are generated based on the posterior mean of the estimated
parameters. Figures 3.3 – 3.6 plot the impulse responses to domestic fiscal shocks compared
with international fiscal spillovers. The solid line denotes the response to UK fiscal consolida-
tion shocks while the dotted-dashed line represents the response to consolidation shock in the
Euro area. For convenience, the standard deviation of each shock is set to 100σˆx such that the
values on the vertical axis can be interpreted as percentage deviation from the steady state
(the horizontal line), while the horizontal axis is the period in quarter.
3.5.1 International Transmission of Fiscal Shocks between the UK
and EA
Figure 3.3 displays the responses of both the UK and EA to a consolidation shock induced by
a cut in government consumption spending. On impact, private consumption and investment
rises, while hours and real wage fall in the home country. The fall in labour supply causes
domestic output to contract which, in turn, leads to less demand for foreign goods, and the
depreciation of the bilateral terms of trade as domestic real interest rate falls below foreign real
interest rate (negative differential), thereby causing domestic households to hold more foreign
assets (capital outflow). These two forces (less import and terms of trade depreciation) reinforce
each other to improve home country’s trade balance. As a result, foreign output falls as well,
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Figure 3.3: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation decrease in government
consumption spending.
Notes: The figure shows the responses of both UK and EA to fiscal shocks from both countries. The impulse
responses are computed based on the posterior mean of the estimated parameters. Solid lines denote responses
to UK government spending shock while the dotted-dashed lines denote responses to EA government spending
shock.
Figure 3.4: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation decrease in government
transfers.
Notes: See Figure 3.3.
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while foreign consumption rises.
In this model, foreign output falls in response to domestic government spending shock for
two reasons: first, due to low demand for foreign goods by home agents (i.e. less export earnings
for foreign country) and, second, due to the depreciation of the bilateral terms of trade which
transfer competitiveness to the home country, thereby worsening the foreign country’s trade
balance. On the other hand, foreign consumption rises primarily because there are now more
domestically produced good in the economy, and relatively cheaper imports. This result is
consistent with the analysis of Corsetti et al. (2010) which finds that an increase in government
spending leads to output expansion, both in the home and foreign economies, and a trade deficit
in the home country. However, in contrast to our result, they found a positive comovement
between private consumption and public spending which they argued is due to a fall in long
run interest rate in their model. Also Gadatsch et al. (2016) observed that a positive shock to
the German government purchases have negative spillover effects on output and consumption
in the rest of the Euro area.
Figure 3.4 plots the impulse responses to government transfer cuts. Since transfer cuts imply
lesser income to the households,8 private consumption falls contemporaneously as households
substitute leisure for more labour hours in order to achieve at least the pre-consolidation level
of consumption. The rise in labour productivity improves the marginal productivity of capital,
causing output to rise in the home country. As home household consumption falls, the demand
for foreign goods decline and the terms of trade depreciates. This, in turn, leads to a fall in
foreign output while foreign consumption rises.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 plot the impulse responses to a positive shock to distortionary taxes on
consumption and labour income respectively. As expected, an increase in consumption tax in
the domestic economy leads to a fall in domestic consumption, while foreign consumption rises.
As households postpone current consumption and substitute leisure for labour, investment rises,
leading to an output expansion in the home country, while foreign output falls. On the other
hand, a tax hike on labour income discourages labour effort, causing real wage to rise in the
home country. The high labour costs leads to a fall in firms’ investment spending, which in
turn leads to a fall in output and consumption in the home country. As domestic income falls,
households borrow from abroad, causing domestic interest rate to rise relative to foreign interest
rate. As a result, the bilateral terms of trade appreciate in the home country which, in turn,
worsen the trade balance condition. In response to this, foreign output rises as international
competitiveness is transferred to the foreign economy, while foreign consumption falls because
8Transfer is an income received not earned.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in consumption
tax rate.
Notes: See Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.6: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in income tax
rate.
Notes: See Figure 3.3.
home goods have become relatively expensive. This result is partly in line with the findings of
Gadatsch et al. (2016) which observed that a rise in German consumption tax causes output
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to contract and private consumption to increase in the rest of the Euro area, while German
labour tax hike does not only crowd-out output and consumption in the home country but also
in the rest of the Euro area.
Comparatively, evidence from the simulation results show that EA consolidation policies
have significant spillover effects on the UK economy, while UK fiscal policies have relatively
minimal effect on EA economic activities. For instance, while UK output response to EA
government spending cut is nearly as high as its response to domestic spending cut, the UK
government spending shock only accounts for about one-tenth of the magnitude of EA spending
shock on EA output. This is partly due to the relatively small size of the UK economy compared
to the aggregate Euro area economy,9 and partly due to the trade effect, as trade between the
two countries constitute nearly half of total UK trade. More so, this analysis shows that the
effect of fiscal spillovers across borders depends on the type of fiscal instrument being considered.
While the spending-based consolidation policies are transmitted across borders through partial
crowding out/in of domestic demand, tax-based policies are transmitted through their effect
on real wages and relative prices.
3.5.2 Fiscal Spillovers and International Asset Market Participation
In Section 3.3.5, we analytically derived that the relative participation of countries at the
international asset market is a significant driving force for their net foreign asset holding which,
in turn, influences cross-border policy responses. In this section, we demonstrate this key
result in the estimated model. To do this, we plot the response of the UK economy to EA
consolidation shocks and vary the share of non-asset holders in the EA (the source country)
relative to the estimated value, while holding constant the estimated share of non-asset holders
in the UK economy (the response country). The simulation results of this exercise are displayed
in Figures 3.7 and 3.8.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 plot the impulse responses of aggregate and agent-specific UK macroe-
conomic variables to EA fiscal consolidation shocks for varying degree of participation of the
source country. For the agent-specific responses, we plot the effective consumption and labour
hours of each type of household. Figure 3.7 shows that UK agents hold less assets in response
to consolidation shocks in the Euro countries, except when the consolidation policy is income
tax-based and the source country have at least the same level of participation with the response
country. As UK agents adjust their foreign asset holding, current balance adjusts accordingly,
9UK GDP is roughly 17% of the size of Euro area GDP.
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Figure 3.7: Effect of changes in relative asset market participation on EA fiscal
spillovers to the UK (aggregate variables).
Notes: The solid lines denote the estimated baseline model with approximately equal asset market participation
rate in both countries i.e. (1− λ∗) ≡ (1− λ). The dash lines denote relatively more asset market participation
in the EA compared to the UK, that is, (1 − λ∗) > (1 − λ). The dotted-dash lines denote relatively less asset
market participation in the EA compared to the UK, that is, (1− λ∗) < (1− λ).
Figure 3.8: Effect of changes in relative asset market participation on EA fiscal
spillovers to the UK (agent-specific variables).
Notes: See Figure 3.7. AH = Asset holders; NAH = Non-asset holders.
which directly translates into adjustments in GDP. Notice that, on impact, there is a one-for-
one relationship between the current account balance and the domestic output. This result
suggests that changes in net asset position, as a result of changes in source-country’s relative
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participation, have a pro-cyclical effect on the response-country’s output.
Regarding the effect of countries’ relative participation at the global asset market, there
are three key lessons observed from the simulation exercise. First, relative participation of
the source country drives the propagation and amplification of fiscal spillovers in the response
country. The higher the relative participation of the source country at the global asset market,
the smaller the amplification effect of fiscal spillovers in the response country, except when
the fiscal spillover is income tax-based. Secondly, in the medium run, relative participation
of the source country have more pronounced effects on the dynamic response of investment
and real wage in the response country. This may be due to the effect of fiscal spillovers on
domestic prices, which in turn affects firms’ investment decisions. Thirdly, from Figure 3.8,
the relative participation of the source country mainly influences the asset holders’ optimal
choices (effective consumption and hours) in the response country in the short run, but this
effect gradually disappear after 4-6 quarters; whereas, it mainly affects the optimal choices
of the non-asset holders in the medium run. One plausible explanation for this could be the
foresight ability of the households: since the domestic asset-holders participate in the global
asset markets, thereby having first-hand information about global liquidity conditions, they
quickly adjust their optimal bundles in response to any change in the portfolio of foreign asset-
holders, and then smooth their choices afterwards. On the other hand, the non-asset holders
suffers from information asymmetry, and only adjust their optimal choices in response to policy
shock after some quarters.
3.6 Conclusion
Motivated by the recent implementation of various consolidation policies across many of the
Euro area member-countries and the United Kingdom, and given that nearly half of the total
UK trade is with the EA, this paper examines the effects of EA fiscal consolidation on UK
economic activity. The paper also seeks to identify the drivers of cross-border fiscal spillover.
To achieve this, we develop a two-country DSGE model in the spirit of Corsetti et al. (2010)
and estimate it on data for the UK and Euro area, featuring incomplete market which implies
limited risk-sharing across countries, exclusion of a fraction of households which exhibit rule-
of-thumb behaviours, and productive government spending.
This paper makes three major contributions: first, different types of households are allowed
to respond differently to fiscal changes; second, we propose a set of implementable fiscal rules
for both economies which match the data; and, third, we analytically derive that, aside country-
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specific characteristics, relative asset market participation is a key driver of countries’ net asset
position and, by extension, cross-country spillovers. Simulation results based on the estimated
model suggest that fiscal spillovers from the EA have significant effects on the UK economic
activity, while UK fiscal policies have negligible effects on the EA economy, which we argue
could be due to the relatively small size of the UK economy and the high proportion of total
UK trade with the EA. The magnitude of these spillover effects strongly depend on the choice
of fiscal instrument employed. Also, it is observed that changes in relative participation of the
source country (EA) of the shock significantly drives the propagation and amplification of fiscal
spillovers in the response country (UK).
Given the implications of our results, we conclude that fiscal spillover can be a major source
of macroeconomic fluctuations in the domestic economy, especially when the spillover is from
a major trading partner. Hence, fiscal authorities are encouraged to coordinate their policies
in order to mitigate against uncertainties surrounding cross-border fiscal policy spillovers.
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Appendix
I: Identification Check
Figure 3.9: Identification of Parameter Priors
Notes: This figure shows the identification strength of the estimated parameters of the baseline
model. The upper panel shows the identification strength of the parameters based on the
Fischer information matrix normalized by either the parameter at the prior mean (blue bars)
or by the standard deviation at the prior mean (red bars). The lower panel further decompose
the relative sensitivity of the model behaviour to each parameter (Pfeifer 2017, Ratto & Iskrev
2011). Evidence from this identification check shows that the estimated parameters are uniquely
identified – since their log-scale is significantly different from zero – and individually play
distinctive roles in the dynamics of the model. Parameters with prefix ‘s’ are for the Euro
Area.
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II: Multivariate Convergence Diagnostics
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Figure 3.10: Multivariate Convergence Diagnostics
Notes: This figure reports the multivariate version of Brooks & Gelman (1998)’s convergence
diagnostics, which is based on the posterior likelihood function for all parameters rather than
individual univariate diagnostics originally proposed by Brooks & Gelman (1998). The top
panel shows the convergence diagnostics for the 80% of the posterior distribution. The blue
line depicts the 80th quantile range based on the pooled draws from all sequences, while the red
line depicts the mean interval range. Convergence is achieved when the two lines are close to
each other and stabilised across the horizon. The second and third panels portray the second
and third moments of the same statistic respectively. Given the result of the convergence
diagnostic reported here, we can conclude that the Monte Carlo Markov Chains (MCMC)
converge to unique posterior value.
76
III: Prior and Posterior Distributions
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
100
200
SE_ea
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
500
1000
SE_eas
0 0.2 0.4 0.6
0
5
10
15
SE_ei
0 0.2 0.4
0
10
20
SE_eis
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
100
200
SE_eg
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
200
400
SE_egs
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
20
40
SE_ez
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
20
40
60
80
SE_ezs
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
50
100
150
SE_etc
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
100
200
300
SE_etcs
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
50
100
SE_etw
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
100
200
SE_etws
0 2 4
0
0.5
1
sigma
1 2 3 4
0
0.5
1
1.5
theta
1 2 3 4
0
0.5
1
stheta
0 1 2 3
0
1
2
eta
0 1 2 3
0
0.5
1
1.5
seta
0 0.2 0.4 0.6
0
2
4
6
kappa
Figure 3.11: Parameter Prior and Posterior Distributions I
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Figure 3.12: Parameter Prior and Posterior Distributions II
78
0 0.5 1 1.5
0
2
4
vthetatw
0 0.5 1 1.5
0
1
2
3
svthetatw
0 0.5 1
0
1
2
3
rhoa
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0
2
4
srhoa
-0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
2
4
rhoi
0 0.5 1
0
1
2
3
srhoi
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0
2
4
rhog
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
2
4
6
srhog
0 0.5 1
0
1
2
3
rhoz
0 0.5 1
0
1
2
3
srhoz
0 0.5 1
0
2
4
rhotc
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0
2
4
srhotc
0 0.5 1
0
2
4
rhotw
0 0.5 1
0
2
4
srhotw
Figure 3.13: Parameter Prior and Posterior Distributions III
Notes: This figure (see also 3.11 and 3.12) plots the prior and posterior distributions of the
estimated parameters. The grey line shows the prior density, the black line depicts the density
of the posterior distribution, while the green vertical line indicates the posterior mode. The
plots show that the posterior estimates are clearly identified.
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Chapter 4
Fiscal Policy and Cross-Border
Spillovers in Europe: New Evidence
from an Agnostic Identification
4.1 Introduction
As the world economy recovers from the Great Recession, one major lesson stands out from
the experience of the last decade: fiscal policy has regained policy relevance in macroeconomic
discourse, as discretionary fiscal measures are widely adopted as stabilization tools in many
developed and emerging economies. During the recent financial crisis, the United States and
European Union enacted and implemented sizeable fiscal stimulus packages to stimulate eco-
nomic recovery.1 A new set of literature has shown that such fiscal measures have sizeable
multiplier effects (Ramey 2011a, Leeper et al. 2017),2 and that these effects vary across states
of the economy (Auerbach & Gorodnichenko 2012, Candelon & Lieb 2013). There is also a
growing literature on the international spillover effects of domestic fiscal policy with many of
them observing sizeable international multipliers, which thereby motivates some policy mak-
1During the recent financial crisis, the United States government enacted and implemented a sizeable fis-
cal stimulus package, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), to aid the recovery of the US
economy. Similarly, the European Union commissioned the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) aimed
at stimulating the recovery of European economies from the effects of the financial crisis. Several studies have
attempted to quantify the effect of ARRA stimulus on output and employment. For instance, Romer & Bern-
stein (2009) estimate that, by 2010Q4, the ARRA should increase ouput by 3.7% while jobs should increase
by 3,675,000. Wilson (2012) quantifies the job-multiplier effect of the ARRA stimulus to be about $125,000
per job, while Feyrer & Sacerdote (2011) estimate the per-job cost to be about $170,000 or $100,000 when
education spending is excluded. Across the Atlantic, Coenen et al. (2013) estimate the multiplier effect if the
EERP stimulus to be 0.52 and 0.57 in the first two years.
2While many studies document sizeable fiscal multipliers, some other studies, such as Cogan et al. (2010),
find much smaller multiplier effects.
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ers to advocate for joint fiscal actions to forestall any future occurrence of global recession
(Auerbach & Gorodnichenko 2013, Corsetti & Mu¨ller 2014).
In this paper, we investigate the effect of an expansion in German government spending
on the domestic economy and the economies of other European economies. This is motivated
by the recent calls by policy makers institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund
and the European Union, for German government to increase its spending in order to boost
economic activities in the rest of the Euro countries.3 Their argument is based on the premise
that a German fiscal expansion would boost domestic demand, thereby increasing the demand
for foreign goods as well as stimulating income and inflation in the rest of Euro countries.
In contrast, the German monetary authority argues that such fiscal expansion would have
relatively small spillover effects on other European economies due to the low import content
of German public expenditure.4 We empirically evaluate this debate in the light of existing
literature on fiscal policy transmission. Specifically, this paper addresses the following policy
questions: What are the effects of expansionary German government spending on domestic
demand for foreign goods? Does an increase in German government spending lead to an output
expansion in other Euro countries? Is there heterogeneity in the responses of foreign economies
to German spending shocks?
To answer these research questions, we proceed in two steps. First, we estimate an open-
economy Bayesian vector autoregresive (BVAR) model for the German economy in order to
quantify the effects of German fiscal expansion on domestic demand for foreign goods. This
methodology involves taking a number of draws and identifying the shocks to each draw using
Uhlig (2005)’s agnostic identification method which imposes sign restrictions on the impulse
response functions. Specifically, we identify a debt-financed government spending shock which
moves government spending, government debt and output in the same direction while we remain
agnostic about the real exchange rate and net exports, which are the key variables of interest
3Following the announcement of a German fiscal surplus of AC23.7 billion or 0.8 percent of GDP for the fiscal
year 2016, which is the fifth year of budget surplus in a row and the highest recorded since reunification in 1991,
some policy makers and institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the European Union, have
called on Germany to increase public spending on investment, education, childcare and migration (International
Monetary Fund 2017, EUobserver 2017, Financial Times 2017a,b). The call is driven by Germany’s large and
persistent current account surplus, which is second to none among G7 countries and in sharp contrast to the
reality in the rest of the Euro Area (Jaumotte & Sodsriwiboon 2010). Some economists argue that Germany’s
huge current account surplus is harmful, creating “a deflationary bias for the euro area, as well as for the world
economy” (U.S. Treasury 2013, Krugman 2013b). The German government refute this claim, arguing that the
country’s surplus is due to its economic competitiveness and world demand for its quality product (Spiegel
2013). But, as Krugman (2013a) notes, high-quality exports do not drive current account surpluses, rather its
the balance of saving and investment.
4See the keynote speech of the president of the Deutsche Bundesbank presented at a recent joint IMF-
Bundesbank conference (Weidmann 2018).
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for examining the spillover effects of German fiscal policy. In the second stage, we quantify the
specific net effect of German fiscal expansion on fifteen European economies by replacing the
external sector variables with bilateral real exchange rates and foreign output.5 In estimating
the international spillover effects of German fiscal policy, we follow the idea of Corsetti &
Mu¨ller (2014) by explicitly controlling for endogenous fiscal adjustments of foreign countries by
including German government spending in relative terms; that is German spending relative to
partner’s spending.
This paper makes three contributions. First, our analysis is among the few studies to
estimate country-by-country effects of cross-border fiscal policy shocks within a sign-restricted
structural VAR model. This methodology allow us to analyse country-specific responses of other
countries to German fiscal shock. Similar empirical studies by Canzoneri et al. (2003), Corsetti
& Mu¨ller (2014) and Beetsma & Giuliodori (2011) all employed the recursive identification
method or Blanchard & Perotti (2002) identification approach, which has been criticised for
being too restrictive and may not contain sufficient information to recover the actual fiscal
shock (see Ramey (2011b) and Forni & Gambetti (2014, 2016)). Whereas, the identification
strategy employed in this paper does not impose any restriction on the impulse responses of
the variables of interest, thereby allowing more precise estimation. Other similar studies, such
as Caporale & Girardi (2013), Hebous & Zimmermann (2013) and Dragomirescu-Gaina &
Philippas (2015), analyse the area-wide transmission of fiscal policy among several European
(or Euro Area) economies within a Global VAR. But responses to cross-border fiscal shocks
can not be analysed on a country-by-country basis using this methodology, which is the focus
of this paper.
Second, this paper is one of the first to empirically investigate country-specific international
transmission of fiscal shocks to a large number of countries within and outside the monetary
union.6 We analyse country-specific spillover effects of German fiscal expansion on 15 European
economies, taking into consideration their exchange rate regimes, relative size and the degree
of sovereign debt risks —GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and non-GIIPS.7
5Similar empirical methods have been employed in the literature to estimate cross-border effects of changes
in government spending and taxes. See, for instance, Canzoneri et al. (2003) and more recently Corsetti &
Mu¨ller (2014).
6While Canzoneri et al. (2003) analyse the effect of US fiscal policy on three European countries (France,
Italy and the UK), Corsetti & Mu¨ller (2014) analyse US fiscal spillovers to aggregate Euro Area and the UK.
Beetsma & Giuliodori (2011) analyse the effects of government spending of the 5 largest EU countries (Germany,
United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain) on the rest-of-EU in a panel of 14 countries. However, the impulse
responses from this panel analysis are for the aggregate EU economy and not specific to each country.
7While the Euro countries have a common currency, the non-Euro countries operate flexible exchange rate
regimes. In terms of relative sizes, France, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom are relatively large countries, while
countries like Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden are relatively small compared to Germany. More so, the
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Third, the data for our analysis extends beyond the period of financial crisis by nearly a decade,
which enables us to examine how the effects of fiscal policy have changed after the crisis period.
In contrast, most of the empirical studies in the literature focused on the pre-crisis period
when fiscal policy was relatively passive, compared to the post-crisis period when fiscal policy
is relatively active.
Our results are as follows: a debt-financed expansion in German government spending leads
to a depreciation of the real exchange rate and the terms of trade, and a deterioration of the
trade balance. The real exchange rate and the terms of trade both respond with lags (four and
two quarters respectively), but the terms of trade returns to its pre-shock level after two years
while the real exchange rate depreciates persistently till the fifth year. The fall in trade balance
is driven mainly by a sharp rise in import demand in the first two years after the shock.
On the cross-border implications of German fiscal expansion, we find a significant degree of
heterogeneity in the dynamic responses of foreign output and bilateral real exchange rates across
sub-groups of the sample countries. The international output multiplier of German spending
is sizeable but mild, ranging between 0.5 and -0.5, which is close to the values reported in the
literature. In the very short-run, an increase in German government spending leads to output
expansion in the non-GIIPS Euro countries and non-Euro countries with strong trade links
with Germany, such as Denmark and Switzerland, but crowds-out output of GIIPS countries.
German fiscal expansion has non-positive effect on output of all the countries in the medium
run. Also, while bilateral real exchange rate appreciates in the short run and depreciates in the
medium run in non-GIIPS countries, it however depreciates with lags (no initial appreciation)
in most of the GIIPS countries. In non-Euro countries, response of the bilateral real exchange
rate is mixed depending on the exchange rate regime they pursue. Various sensitivity analyses
are conducted to check the robustness of the results to additional restrictions, variations in the
sample period, and alternative assumptions of constant and trend terms in the VAR estimation.
The results of these analyses show that our result are stable and robust.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 4.2, we discuss the identification
strategy employed for our VAR analysis. Section 4.3 presents the estimation results. Section 4.4
presents further results of various sensitivity and robustness checks, while Section 4.5 concludes.
GIIPS countries have relatively high sovereign debt risks compared to Germany; that is, their risk of default on
sovereign debt in the event of a crisis is relatively high.
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4.2 Identifying Government Spending Shock
There is an ongoing debate in contemporary fiscal policy literature on how fiscal shocks should
be identified. Four major approaches have been used in the literature: (1) the recursive ap-
proach with Cholesky decomposition, (2) the structural fiscal VAR approach of Blanchard &
Perotti (2002), (3) the Uhlig (2005)’s agnostic identification approach with sign restrictions
and (4) the narrative or event-study approach of Ramey & Shapiro (1998), which was further
developed recently by Ramey (2011b). While structural VARs based on zero restriction (the
recursive or the Blanchard-Perotti approach) are rather atheoretical in the sense that the un-
derlying DSGE model rarely imply zero restriction, this is not the case for the sign restrictions
(Canova 2007, Ch. 4). Meanwhile, standard fiscal VAR models have been critiqued on the
grounds that the government spending innovations are non-fundamental (or non-invertible) as
the model does not contain sufficient information (such as market expectation) to recover the
actual fiscal shocks. This has been argued to be the case mainly in high frequency (quarterly)
series where agents act on news of future changes in fiscal policy at some quarters before the
actual implementation of the policy.8 Also, Benati & Surico (2009) argue that VAR models
may give uninformative results when used to analyse policy stimulus during regime changes.
To account for the omitted variables in fiscal VAR, Ramey & Shapiro (1998) use natural
experiment to construct US war-date series based on large military announcements in the press.
Ramey (2011b) incorporates this war-date series, and the Survey of Professional Forecasters as
an alternative, in a fiscal VAR model for the US economy and suggests that both series should
be ordered first. The main criticism of this identification method is the subjective approach
of constructing the war-date series, which is at the mercy of the researcher. Fisher & Peters
(2010) also control for market expectation of US government spending by incorporating the
excess stock returns of large (top 3) military contractors to the US government in their fiscal
VAR model.
4.2.1 Sign Restriction VAR Identification
The identification of structural VAR models using sign restrictions can be described as follows.
Consider a reduced-form VAR model of order p:
Yt =
d∑
j=0
µjt
j +
p∑
i=1
BiYt−i + et, for t = 1, ...T (4.1)
8See Beetsma & Giuliodori (2011) for review of literature.
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where Yt is a k-dimensional vector of endogenous variables, µ0 is a constant, t is the trend
term with a maximum polynomial order of d,9 Bi are k × k coefficient matrices, and et is a k-
dimensional vector of one-step ahead reduced-form innovations with variance-covariance matrix
Σe = E[ete
′
t].
The essence of VAR identification is to translate the reduced-form VAR innovations into
economically meaningful and invertible structural shocks, εt, which are assumed to be or-
thonormal; that is, they are mutually orthogonal and have a normalized unit variance. Hence,
E[εtε
′
t] = Im. The theory of the structural VAR identification assumes that the structural
shocks, εt, are related to the reduced-form predictor errors, et, through a matrix A such that:
10
et = Aεt, and (4.2)
Σe = E[ete
′
t] = AE[εtε
′
t]A
′ = AA′. (4.3)
The nth column of matrix A represents the impulse vector or the immediate impact of a one
standard error innovation to the nth structural shock. However, matrix A, in its current form,
is not uniquely identified. Conventional identification methods impose k(k − 1)/2 restrictions
on matrix A or its inverse either via recursive assumption using Cholesky decomposition or
short-run structural relationships or long-run structural relationships or a combination of both.
To identify the structural model, we adopt the agnostic identification method proposed by
Uhlig (2005), and applied to monetary and fiscal policy analysis by Scholl & Uhlig (2008) and
Mountford & Uhlig (2009). The method imposes sign restrictions on the impulse response
functions of the endogenous variables for a specific number of periods after the shock. Unlike
in other identification methods, an interesting feature of this method is that the number of
structural shocks to be identified can be less than the number of endogenous variables; that
is m ≤ k. Thus, this method is more suitable for our analysis since we seek to identify just a
single shock – the government spending shock.11 Fry & Pagan (2011) identify some issues with
sign-restriction identifications. They argue that sign restriction are set restriction and therefore
a range of different model can satisfy the sign restriction. Therefore, selecting the median of
9When d is set to 0, the VAR model includes only a constant term; d = 1 implies a constant and a linear
time trend, while d = 2 implies a constant and quadratic time trend. When the first term on the right hand
side of equation (4.1) is excluded, then the VAR model is estimated with a no-constant no-trend assumption.
10Given our specification of the VAR model, matrix A is the inverse of the contemporaneous matrix.
11Several other papers have employed the sign-restriction method to identify a single shock. For instance,
Uhlig (2005), Scholl & Uhlig (2008) and Vargas-Silva (2008) analyse only the effect of monetary policy shock
on US output, exchange rates and US housing market respectively. Dedola & Neri (2007) estimate a structural
VAR model with sign restrictions to identify only technology shock. Fujita (2011) identifies and analyzes only
the effect of aggregate shock on US labour market, while Chen & Liu (2018) study the individual effect of
government consumption and government investment spending on real exchange rate in China.
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each impulse response function is wrong because the median of each impulse response function
might have been generated by a different underlying DSGE model. They suggested minimising
the distance of each draw from the median.
The implementation of the sign restriction identification involves a number of stems. First,
the reduced-form VAR model is estimated using Bayesian method and estimates of Bˆ, eˆt and
Σˆe are obtained. Following Uhlig (2005), the Bayesian prior for estimating the VAR parameters
(B,Σe) has a density that belongs to the Normal-Wishart distribution. By implication, the
posterior density will also belong to the Normal-Wishart family. Next, a unique lower-triangular
matrix P can be computed from the estimated variance-covariance matrix, Σˆe, using some
decompositions, e.g Cholesky decomposition, such that PP ′ = Σˆe. Alternatively, P ′ = chol(Σˆe).
Next, using the Bayesian method, n random samples of Bˆ = [Bˆ0 Bˆ1 ... Bˆk] and Σˆe are
drawn from their posterior distributions. Then, random selections of a combination (Bˆ, Σˆe) are
drawn from the constructed n samples in the earlier step to construct an orthonormal matrix
Q which satisfies QQ′ = Ik.12 Given the property of Q, the matrix Aˆ can be recovered from
the Cholesky decomposition of Σˆe as follows:
PIkP
′ = Σˆe
PQQ′P ′ = Σˆe = AˆAˆ′ (4.4)
where Aˆ = PQ is a candidate matrix of the structural model. If the implied impulse response
functions satisfy the identifying restrictions, we retain Q; otherwise, Q is discard. The above
steps are repeated for a large number of times, while recording each Q that satisfy the sign
restrictions and saving the corresponding impulse functions.
Given this information, estimates of the structural shocks can be computed as:
eˆt = Aˆεˆt (4.5)
By construction, εˆt is serially uncorrelated. Fry & Pagan (2007, 2011) suggest that it is more
efficient to work with shocks that have unit variance. This can be done by dividing each
estimated structural shock, εˆ
(k)
t , by its standard deviation. Let Sˆ be a diagonal matrix of the
estimated standard deviations of the structural shocks. Thus, we can rewrite the estimated
12For step-by-step details of the QR decomposition for constructing Q, see Kilian & Murphy (2012). Note
that, while Q is constructed from randomly selected combination of Bˆ and Σˆe, it does not depend on the data
(Kilian & Lu¨tkepohl 2017, ch. 13).
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version of equation (4.2) as:
eˆt = AˆSˆSˆ
−1εˆt = Tˆ ˆt (4.6)
where Tˆ = AˆSˆ is the rescaled version of the impact matrix, and ˆt = Sˆ
−1εˆt, which is the
rescaled version of εˆt, is the vector of normalised structural shocks with unit variance.
After the computation, summary statistics of the grid of impulse responses that satisfy the
sign restrictions are reported, such as the median impulse response and its percentile bounds
—say, 16th and 84th percentiles. As Fry & Pagan (2011) note, the percentile bounds in this
case do not correspond to standard confidence intervals obtained from Bayesian estimations or
bootstrapping which depict critical regions.
4.2.2 Data and Estimation Strategy
To conduct the estimation procedure for this empirical analysis, we rely on time series data
at quarterly frequency for the period 1995:Q1 – 2016:Q4. Our choice of 1995 as the start
date is partly motivated by the German unification date (1991) when reliable data become
available for the German federation, and partly by the availability of reliable quarterly series
for the response countries analysed in this paper. The sample countries are Germany (the source
country of the fiscal shock), along with 10 other Euro Area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) and five non-Euro countries
(Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). The choice of sample
countries is motivated by existing studies in the literature (see Beetsma & Giuliodori (2011),
Corsetti & Mu¨ller (2014), Canzoneri et al. (2003)). In addition to the 14 European Union (EU)
countries included in the panel analysis of Beetsma et al. (2006, 2008) and Beetsma & Giuliodori
(2011), our sample also includes Norway and Switzerland, which are non-EU countries. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is one of the first to analyse country-specific cross-border
effects of fiscal policy for member and non-member countries of the European monetary union.
To address the questions raised in this paper, we estimate two variants of the baseline VAR
estimation. First, we estimate the effects of exogenous shock to German government spending
on the domestic economy. The German fiscal VAR model contains six time series: four main
variables (log of real government spending, log of real GDP (output), consolidated government
debt-to-GDP ratio and ex-post long-term real interest rate) and two external sector variables
(we rotate, in turn, log of real effective exchange rate and log of the terms of trade, and also
rotate exports-to-GDP ratio, imports-to-GDP ratio and trade balance ratio). The real variables
are constructed using the GDP price deflator series. All the variables are multiplied by 100
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such that their responses can be interpreted directly as percentage deviation from steady state
or percentage point deviation for real interest rate and ratio variables.
In the second variant of the VAR model, we estimate the spillover effects of German spend-
ing shock on foreign output and real exchange rate. To do this, we replace the external sec-
tor variables in German fiscal VAR with foreign output and bilateral real exchange rate of
the partner-countries. To correctly estimate the country-specific net effect of German fiscal
spillover, we follow the idea of Corsetti & Mu¨ller (2014) by including German government
spending in relative terms; that is German government spending relative to partner country-i’s
government spending. This transformation is necessary in order to control for the endogenous
response of fiscal policy in foreign economies. When the endogenous fiscal adjustments in for-
eign country are not controlled for, the estimated spillover effects become rescaled versions of
the effect in the source country (see, for instance, Canzoneri et al. (2003)).
The data for this analysis are collated from various sources. The series of GDP components
are obtained from the Eurostat, the exchange rate series are collected from the database of
Bank for International Settlements, while the interest rate data is obtained from OECD Main
Economic Indicators database. The government debt data is collected from the World Bank’s
Quarterly Public Sector Debt database. The baseline VAR estimation include a constant and
a quadratic time trend in order to adequately control for time effect and major area-wide and
country-specific event episodes.13
4.2.3 Identifying Restrictions
Government spending shock can be defined in several ways. A surprise (unanticipated) shock to
government spending have an impact effect on government spending and other macroeconomic
variables. In contrast, a few studies have shown that fiscal actions are well anticipated by agents
due to decision and implementation lags. As a result, fiscal announcements lead to changes
in macroeconomic and financial variables before the actual time of impact of the policy. This
is referred to as anticipated fiscal shock, or simply fiscal foresight (Forni & Gambetti 2016,
Leeper et al. 2012, Ramey 2011b). Government spending shock can also be classified according
to how it is financed. A tax-financed government spending shock moves government spending
and taxes in the same direction with no change in deficit for a given period. On the other hand,
a deficit-financed government spending shock moves government spending and deficit/debt in
13The major event episodes observed in the data which may affect the results of our analysis include the
establishment of the common monetary system in the Euro Area in 1999, the global financial crisis of 2008-
2009, the sovereign debt crisis of 2012-2013, and the peg of the Swiss franc ceiling again the Euro over the
period 2011:Q3 – 2015:Q1.
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Table 4.1: Identifying Sign Restrictions for Government Spending Shock
Response of Sign Motivation
German Variables
Government spending + Canova & Pappa (2007), Mountford & Uhlig (2009)
Output + Pappa (2009), Gal´ı et al. (2007)
Government debt + Canova & Pappa (2007), Mountford & Uhlig (2009)
Real Interest Rate ? (+) Kim & Roubini (2008), Kim (2015)
Effective RER, TOT ? Enders et al. (2011)
expy, impy, tby ? Enders et al. (2011)
Foreign Economy Variables
Foreign output ?
Bilateral RER ?
Notes: This table shows the sign restrictions on the impulse responses for the identified government
spending shock. RER stands for real exchange rate, TOT stands for terms of trade, “expy” stands for
exports-to-GDP ratio, “impy” stands for imports-to-GDP ratio while “tby” stands for net exports-to-
GDP (trade balance) ratio. A ‘+’ sign implies that the impulse response of the variable in question
is restricted to be positive for four quarters following the shock, including the quarter of impact. A
‘?’ implies that we are agnostic about the response of the variable in question; that is, no restrictions
have been imposed.
the same direction for a given period with no change in taxes (Mountford & Uhlig 2009, Pappa
2009, Canova & Pappa 2007).
In this paper, we focus on a surprised debt-financed government spending shock. However,
following Forni & Gambetti (2016) and Yang (2007), we control for bond market signals about
anticipated changes in government spending by incorporating long-term real interest rate in our
model. A summary of the set of identifying sign restrictions imposed on the impulse responses
is provided in Table 4.1. We define a debt-financed government spending shock as a shock that
moves government consumption spending, government debt and output in the same direction
for four quarters following the shock, including the impact period. Following Mountford & Uhlig
(2009), a tight restriction of four quarters is imposed in order to rule out highly transitory shock
to government spending. For instance, a fall in government spending in one or two quarters
after an initial increase. This restriction is also consistent with annual fiscal planning in many
countries.
The identified sign restrictions on output is consistent with both standard real business cycle
(RBC) models and even highly stylistic New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models, such as that of Smets & Wouters (2003, 2007) and Christiano et al. (2005). In
these models, an increase in government spending raises output mainly due to its additive effect
on the economic resource constraint.14 In more specialised models, such as Gal´ı et al. (2007)’s
model with rule-of-thumb consumers, or models in which government spending directly enters
14For a closed-economy model, the resource constraint is given as: Yt = Ct + It +Gt.
89
household preferences as in Coenen et al. (2013), government spending raises output through
its effect on household consumption. Also, empirical studies based on structural VAR models
often produce positive fiscal multipliers. In a survey carried out by Ramey (2011a), estimate of
government spending multiplier in the literature ranges between 0.6 to 1.8, though some other
studies, such as Cogan et al. (2010), find much smaller fiscal multipliers. Pappa (2009) also
restricted output to rise in response to government spending shock while remaining agnostic
about employment and real wage.
Regarding the restriction on the impulse response of the real interest rate, we initially
remain agnostic given the inconclusiveness of findings in the empirical literature. RBC models
predict that real interest rate should rise in response to a government spending shock to reflect
the cost of deficit-financing. Similar results are observed in New-Keynesian DSGE models
where both nominal interest and inflation rise in response to spending shock,15 but the rise in
nominal interest relative to inflation depends on the monetary accommodativeness of the central
bank. Empirical studies of Kim (2015) and Kim & Roubini (2008) find evidence in support of
the theoretical model that real interest rate rises in response to government spending shock;
whereas, Ramey (2011b), Corsetti et al. (2012) and Corsetti & Mu¨ller (2014) document a fall
in real interest rate, suggesting monetary accommodativeness of fiscal policy. However, Ramey
(2011b) notes that the fall in real interest rate may be due to the erratic behaviour of US
inflation.
Following standard practice in the empirical literature, we remain agnostic about the re-
sponses of our variables of interest. Standard business cycle models predict that a positive
shock to government spending raises the relative price of domestic goods, causing a real ap-
preciation of the domestic currency and the terms of trade and a deterioration of the trade
balance. However, in a New-Keynesian DSGE model, Corsetti et al. (2010, 2012) show that
government spending increase could depreciate the real exchange rate if long-term real interest
rate falls in anticipation of a medium-term consolidation to slowdown the path of government
debt. The key factor here is the anticipated spending reversal. Corsetti et al. (2012) also
document an empirical evidence in support of the spending reversal hypothesis along with a
depreciation of the real exchange rate in an analysis for the US economy. In another empirical
analysis for the US economy relative to an aggregate of industrialized economies comprising the
Euro Area, Japan, Canada and the UK, Enders et al. (2011) derive robust sign restrictions for
government spending shock within a New-Keynesian DSGE model but impose no restriction
on real exchange rate, terms of trade and net exports. Their findings show that an expansion
15see for instance Enders et al. (2011).
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in government spending depreciates both the real exchange rate and the terms of trade.
To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any existing empirical study that esti-
mate country-specific international fiscal spillover in a sign-identified VAR model. Theoretical
postulations from two-country DSGE models suggest that cross-border effect of home-country
government spending shock on foreign output could be positive or negative depending on the
calibration of the model. However, previous VAR estimations based on zero-restriction iden-
tification often produce positive spillover effects (see Canzoneri et al. (2003) and Corsetti &
Mu¨ller (2014)). Based on these facts, we impose no restriction on the impulse responses of
foreign output. But, to consistently estimate the spillover effects for each foreign economy, we
impose sign restrictions on all German main variables in the VAR model, including real interest
rate.16
4.3 Results
In this section, we report the results of our estimated sign-restricted VAR model. First, we
estimate the VAR model described in Section 4.2.1 on time series data for the German economy,
comprising government spending, government debt ratio, output, real interest rate and external
sector variables. German exports, imports and net exports ratios are rotated in turn, likewise
the real effective exchange rate and the terms of trade. In the second stage, we re-estimate
the VAR model in order to quantify the net spillover effects of German spending increase by
replacing German spending with German-to-partner’s spending and replacing external sector
variables with foreign output and bilateral real exchange rate.17
4.3.1 Domestic Effects of German Government Spending
Figure 4.1 displays the impulse responses computed from the estimated fiscal VAR model for
the German economy. The debt-financed government spending shock is identified as a shock
that moves government spending, government debt and output in the same direction for four
quaters. The shock being analysed here is a normalised one standard deviation shock. For
ease of interpretation, the impulse responses of all variables have also been rescaled by the
16In the spillover VAR estimation, we rely on the initial response of real interest rate in the baseline VAR
model for Germany to identify the appropriate restriction for the variable. As discussed in the next section,
German real interest rate rises in the first year, though with a lag. Hence, the modified identifying restrictions
for the spillover VAR entail that German relative spending, output, government debt and real interest rate all
rise in the first year after the shock, while no restriction is imposed on foreign variables.
17In estimating the VAR models reported in this section, this paper benefits greatly from the use of Am-
brogio Cesa-Bianchi’s VAR toolbox, which is available for download here: https://sites.google.com/site/
ambropo/MatlabCodes
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Figure 4.1: Baseline Responses to a Normalised One-Standard Deviation German
Government Spending Shock.
Notes: Solid lines display the median impulse responses while the dotted-dashed lines show the 16th and 84th
percentiles. Horizontal axes measure the quarters, while the vertical axes measure the percentage deviation
from trend level or percentage points deviation from pre-shock level for real interest rate and ratio variables.
For the real exchange rate and terms of trade, an increase implies a depreciation.
impact response of government spending. Hence, output response can be interpreted as impact
effects (see Ramey (2016)). The solid lines denote the median impulse responses, while the
dotted-dashed lines plot the 16th and 84th percentiles. Vertical lines indicate imposed sign-
restrictions. The horizontal axes measure the quarters while the vertical axes measure the
percentage deviation from trend level or percentage points deviation from pre-shock level for
interest rate and ratio variables.
From the top left panel of Figure 4.1, government spending rises persistently and remains
significantly above its trend level up to the third year. For a one percent increase in government
spending, German output increases by nearly one percent on impact. However, the initial rise
in output is limited to the period for which we imposed sign restrictions, slowing down up to
the end of the third year and then rising again till the fifth year. Mountford & Uhlig (2009)
and Enders et al. (2011) find similar weak response for output after a spending increase. In
line with the evidence reported by Corsetti et al. (2012) and Corsetti & Mu¨ller (2014), debt-to-
GDP ratio rises persistently until the fourth year and then fall below its trend level, implying
higher taxes in the future and medium-run debt consolidation. Although the long-term real
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interest rate is left unrestricted, it initially rises by about 50 basis points after two quarters,
but falls significantly below its preshock level after 6 quarters. The initial rise in real interest
rate reflects the rising cost of government borrowing, while the subsequent fall is due to agents’
anticipation of fiscal consolidation as reflected in the medium-term response of government
debt. This result is consistent with the findings of Forni & Gambetti (2016) and Corsetti et al.
(2012) that long-term interest rate falls after one year in response to a positive unanticipated
government spending shock, though their empirical strategy is different from ours.
Turning to our variables of interest, the second and third columns of the middle panel of
Figure 4.1 show the impulse responses of German real effective exchange rate and terms of
trade to the government spending shock. In response to a debt-financed government spending
shock, real exchange rate depreciates contemporaneously but significantly only after one year.
Similarly, terms of trade worsens after two quarters, but returns to its preshock level after two
years. In line with the findings of Corsetti et al. (2012), responses of real exchange rate and
the terms of trade seem to be driven by the anticipated effect of future consolidation on real
interest rate. In anticipation of a future debt-consolidation financed by increase in taxes, real
interest rate falls which, in turn, leads to a depreciation of the real exchange rate and terms of
trade. This result is also consistent with the empirical findings of Enders et al. (2011) and Kim
& Roubini (2008) for the US, Monacelli & Perotti (2010) for the US, UK and Australia, and
Kim (2015) for a panel of 18 advanced countries which show that a positive spending shock is
followed by a real currency depreciation. Whereas, Born et al. (2013), Ilzetzki et al. (2013),
Beetsma & Giuliodori (2011) and Beetsma et al. (2008) all document a real appreciation of the
exchange rate, while Beetsma et al. (2006) find no significant response for real exchange rate
after a government spending increase.
The last row of Figure 4.1 displays the impulse responses of external trade to government
spending shock. A positive government spending shock deteriorates the trade balance up to
the fourth year. This result seems to be driven mainly by an increase in domestic demand for
foreign goods as imports-to-GDP rises on impact by about 0.5 percentage points, further rising
to a peak effect of 1 percentage points after two quarters before returning to its preshock level
after two years. On the other hand, German exports-to-GDP marginally deteriorates in the
second year. This result is in line with the findings of Kollmann et al. (2015) which show that
an expansion in German government consumption or investment spending raises German GDP
and deteriorates the current account position. Meanwhile, empirical literature on the effect of
fiscal policy on trade and current account balance is inconclusive. While Beetsma et al. (2008),
Monacelli & Perotti (2010) and Born et al. (2013) find a deterioration of the trade balance after
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a fiscal expansion, Kim & Roubini (2008), Ilzetzki et al. (2013) and Kim (2015) find evidence
in support of an improvement in the current account balance.
In summary, our analysis shows that a debt-financed increase in German government spend-
ing depreciates the real exchange rate and deteriorates the trade balance position. These results
are well-documented by existing studies that used standard short run and long run restrictions.
Evidence from our analysis suggests that the deterioration of the net exports is not necessarily
driven by a decline in exports (which would have suggested an increase in domestic absorption
of home-produced goods or imports substitution), but by an increase in domestic demand for
imports. Given the degree of leakage in domestic income through imports, it is likely that an
increase in German government spending may have some effects on foreign output, especially
in countries with strong trade ties. This is the focus of the next section.
4.3.2 Spillover Effects of German Government Spending
In Figure 4.2 and 4.3, we turn to the analysis of cross-border spillover effects of German
government spending shock on other European economies. As discussed above, we net off the
domestic fiscal response of foreign government spending in order to ascertain the net effects of
German government spending on foreign output. Hence, the fiscal instrument of interest here
is the German government spending relative to country-i’s spending. Like before, the shock
analysed is a normalised one standard deviation shock. Hence, output response can be expressed
as impact effects. The real exchange rate responses can be interpreted as percentage changes
in bilateral real exchange rate resulting from one percent net increase in German government
spending. An increase in the bilateral real exchange rate implies a real depreciation of partner-
country’s exchange rate relative to Germany. For comparison purpose, the Euro countries are
classified into GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and non-GIIPS (Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France and Netherlands) countries. The GIIPS countries are among the
most affected countries in Europe during the financial crisis, with high public debt growth and
high sovereign risk premia (Beetsma et al. 2013). Given that our study period covers nearly a
decade after the financial crisis, it is likely that the response of foreign output and exchange
rates in GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries may differ.
Figure 4.2a shows the computed impulse responses for the non-GIIPS countries. German
government spending appears to have sizeable expansionary effect on output of non-GIIPS Euro
countries. German spending shock crowds-in output on impact in most of the countries, but
this effect is reversed after one year and then recovering again after 10 quarters. Since German
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(a) Non-GIIPS Countries (b) GIIPS Countries
Figure 4.2: Spillover Effects of German Government Spending Shock on Euro Coun-
tries
Notes: The shock being analysed is a one standard normalised deviation shock. The fiscal instrument here is
the relative German-to-partner’s government spending in logs. Solid lines display the median impulse responses
while the dotted-dashed lines shows the 16th and 84th percentiles. For the bilateral real exchange rate, an
increase implies a depreciation.
spending is relatively ineffective after this period, the latter recovery of foreign output may be
associated with individual country’s own-fiscal policy rather than German fiscal policy. The
initial output responses are much stronger in Austria and Netherlands with strong trade ties
with Germany, reaching a peak effect of about 0.5 percent. In Belgium and France, the initial
output response is relatively mild and marginally significant with a peak effect of about 0.3
percent, while Finland’s output response is insignificant in the first two years.
The effect of German government spending shock on bilateral real exchange rate is noticeable
for almost all the non-GIIPS Euro countries, except for the Netherlands. German spending
shock appreciate the bilateral real exchange rates of non-GIIPS countries in the first two to
three years, and then depreciate afterwards. On average, the initial appreciation of the bilateral
real exchange rate peaks at about 0.3 percent in Belgium to about 0.8 percent in Finland, while
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Figure 4.3: Spillover Effects of German Government Spending Shock on Non-Euro
Countries.
Notes: The shock being analysed is a one standard normalised deviation shock. The fiscal instrument here is
the relative German-to-partner’s government spending in logs. Solid lines display the median impulse responses
while the dotted-dashed lines shows the 16th and 84th percentiles. For the bilateral real exchange rate, an
increase implies a depreciation.
the subsequent depreciation peaks at about 0.2 percent in Belgium to 0.5 percent in Austria.
However, since these countries have a common currency with Germany, these effects simply
reflect changes in relative prices in response to an increase in German demand for foreign
goods.
In Figure 4.2b, we plot the impulse responses for output and bilateral real exchange rate of
the GIIPS countries. German spending shock appears to have a non-positive effect on output of
the GIIPS countries. An exception is the case of Italy where output marginally increases in the
first two quarters with a peak effect of about 0.3 percent in the second quarter, but then slow
down in the medium run. Greek output peaks at about -0.7 percent after six quarters while
Spanish and Portuguese output peak at about -0.6 percent after two years. Changes in German
government spending does not seem to have any significant effect on Irish output and bilateral
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real exchange rate. On average, an expansion in German government spending depreciates the
bilateral real exchange rates of the GIIPS countries with a lag of 6–12 quarters. The medium
run depreciation of the real exchange rate peaks at about 0.2 percent in Greece, Italy and
Portugal and at 0.4 percent in Spain. Interestingly, the result shows a strong correlation in
output and real exchange rate responses across the countries on the Iberian peninsula (Spain and
Portugal). In both countries, German spending shock depreciates the bilateral real exchange
rate and crowds-out output with 4–8 quarters lag.
The estimated impulse responses for the non-Euro countries are displayed in Figure 4.3.
Compared to the Euro countries, output and real exchange rate responses in non-Euro coun-
tries exhibit significant heterogeneity. While German government spending crowds-in foreign
output in Denmark and Switzerland with a peak effect of about 0.5 percent in the first year, it
crowds-out Swedish and UK output in the medium run with a peak effect of about -1 percent
by the end of the second year, while it has no significant effect on Norway’s output. Similarly,
while German spending shock significantly appreciates bilateral real exchange rates in the Scan-
dinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), it has no significant effect on Switzerland
and UK’s real exchange rates, at least in the short to medium run. However, the inflow of for-
eign exchange into the Scandinavian countries only translates to output expansion in Denmark,
which maintains a pegged exchange rate to the euro even though it is not a member-country
of the Euro Area. A possible explanation for this could be the strong appreciation of bilateral
real exchange rates in Norway and Sweden which crowds-out the gains from trade. This also
appears to be the case for Finland. Compared to Denmark with a peak appreciation of 0.5
percent, the peak effect of real exchange rate appreciation in Norway and Sweden is 4 times as
much, and near twice as much in Finland.
Comparing the results of German fiscal spillovers for Euro and non-Euro countries, two
empirical findings stands out. First, there is a significant degree of homogeneity in the dynamic
responses of output and real exchange rate in Euro countries, compared to heterogeneous
responses in non-Euro countries. A good explanation for this could be the strong economic
integration among Euro countries with common currency and monetary policy. Although the
European Monetary Union was established in 1999, many of the member-countries already
maintained a fixed exchange rate with Germany as at the beginning of our study period in
1995. Second, percentage changes in bilateral real exchange rates are relatively larger in non-
Euro countries compared to the Euro countries. Also, unlike in most Euro countries where real
exchange rate depreciates in the medium run after an initial appreciation, real exchange rates
in non-Euro countries do not depreciate in the medium. This result could be attributed to the
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exchange rate system maintained by the foreign countries. While a fixed nominal exchange rate
is maintained in the entire Euro Area, non-Euro countries maintain floating nominal exchange
rates against the euro. Denmark is an exception with a pegged exchange rate against the euro.
Also, the upper limit of the Swiss franc was pegged against the euro between September 2011
and January 2015.
Overall, our results suggest that most of the increase in German domestic demand for
foreign goods, due to a fiscal expansion, are channelled towards goods from non-GIIPS Euro
countries and non-Euro countries with strong degree of integration with the German economy.
These results are comparable to existing empirical findings documented in the literature. For
instance, Beetsma & Giuliodori (2011) estimate a panel VAR model with zero-restriction for 14
EU countries for the period 1970-2004. They find that an increase in government spending of
large EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain or the UK) leads to an expansion in output
of the rest of Europe with a peak effect of 0.35 percent after three years. In a similar study
to ours, Corsetti & Mu¨ller (2014) estimate country-specific effects of US government spending
on UK and Euro Area in a fiscal VAR model identified using both Blanchard & Perotti (2002)
and Ramey (2011b) identification methods. They find that the results are similar under both
identification methods with an exogenous expansion in US government spending raising UK and
Euro Area output by 1 and 0.5 percent respectively. Regarding the dynamics of the exchange
rate, Corsetti & Mu¨ller (2014) find that US bilateral real exchange rate relative to UK and
Euro Area depreciates in response to US spending shock. In another similar study, Canzoneri
et al. (2003) find that an exogenous shock to US government spending persistently increases
output of Italy, UK and France with a peak effect of 38%, 70% and 75% of US GDP, and leads
to a real depreciation of their real effective exchange rate, though France’s real exchange rate
initially appreciates.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to check the robustness of the results presented in the previous section, we conduct
several sensitivity analyses, including sensitivity to additional restrictions and shocks, the post-
financial crisis events, and constant and trend terms in the model specification. First, following
some concerns raised in the literature regarding the identification of a single-shock within
sign-restricted structural VARs,18 we check whether the results of our single-shock model are
sensitive to additional identifying restrictions or shocks. To do this, we identify a new shock
18See detailed discussions by Fry & Pagan (2007, 2011).
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(a) A: Monetary Policy Shock
(b) B: Fiscal Policy Shock
Figure 4.4: Sensitivity Analysis I: Single-Shock vs. Multiple-Shock model.
Notes: See Figure 4.1. The monetary policy shock is identify first and it is orthogonal to the fiscal policy shock.
Solid lines denote baseline responses from the single-shock model, dashed lines denote multiple-shock model,
while the dotted-dashed lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles for the multiple-shock models.
which raises the real interest rate, appreciates the real exchange rate and causes output to fall
in the first four quarters. This shock can be interpreted as a monetary policy shock. Following
Mountford & Uhlig (2009), the monetary policy shock is identified first and it is orthogonal to
the fiscal policy shock.
Figure 4.4 displays the impulse responses computed from the multiple-shock model. Solid
lines display baseline responses from the single-shock model while the dashed lines depicts
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Figure 4.5: Sensitivity Analysis II: Pre-Crisis vs. Full Sample Period
Notes: See Figure 4.1. Solid lines depict baseline responses, dashed lines depict responses for the alternative
pre-crisis model, while the dotted-dashed lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles for the alternative model.
impulse responses from the multiple-shock model. The dotted-dashed lines show the 16th and
84th percentiles. Figure 4.4b compares impulse responses for government spending shock under
the single-shock and multiple-shock signed-VARs. The results show that there is no significant
change in the impulse responses from both models as the median responses overlay each other
in most cases. This shows that our estimated fiscal shock is robust to additional restrictions
and is not biased by the identification of additional shocks.
From Figure 4.4a, in response to a monetary policy shock, real interest rate rises for the
first four quarters for which the sign restriction is imposed and then fall afterwards. As a
result, real exchange rate (falls) appreciates in the first four quarters and then depreciates as
real interest rate falls. The initial appreciation of the real exchange rate transfers international
competitiveness to foreign economy and leads to the deterioration of the trade balance. Output
falls for an extended period in response to a monetary policy shock, but rises as real interest
rate fall below its preshock level. Given the initial rise in the cost of borrowing, public debt
quickly builds up, reaching a peak effect of about 6 percent after two years before gradually
slowing down towards its preshock level. To dampen the effect of high real interest rate on
output, government spending initially rises but quickly returns to its preshock level after three
quarters.
Second, we check whether our result is sensitive to the events of the last decade following the
financial crisis. This period is particularly characterised by low inflation, effective lower-bound
on interest rate, and productivity stagnation in many European countries. And as existing
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studies have shown, these features could significantly affect the relative strength of fiscal policy
and the dynamics of fiscal multipliers (see Correia et al. (2013) and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al.
(2015)). To check this, we exclude the period after the financial crisis from our sample period;
that is, data up to 2008:Q4. This left us with only 60 percent of our initial sample observation.
Due to the small sample size, we include only one lag in this VAR estimation. Figure 4.5 shows
the result of this estimation. Solid lines depict baseline responses, dashed lines depict impulse
responses for the alternative pre-crisis model, and the dotted-dashed lines are the 16th and 84th
percentiles for the alternative model. Focusing on our variables of interest, the responses of real
exchange rate and net exports are directly comparable in both versions of the model. German
spending depreciates the real exchange rate with a lag and causes deterioration of the trade
balance. However, real exchange rate in the baseline model lies outside the 84th percentile
of the alternative model after three years, while baseline net exports response marginally lies
outside the 84th percentile of the alternative model between the third and eighth quarter. This
result shows that our agnostic identification of German fiscal shock produces relatively stable
results across the time period.
Finally, we check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of constant and trend terms in
the baseline model. There is no consensus in the literature regarding the appropriate assumption
for constant and trend to be included in the estimation of fiscal VARs. For instance, Mountford
& Uhlig (2009) assume no constant or time trend, Enders et al. (2011) include only a constant,
Corsetti & Mu¨ller (2014) include a constant and a linear time trend, while Ramey (2016)
considers a constant and a quadratic time trend. For this reason, we compare our baseline
model, with a constant and a quadratic time trend, to models with no constant or trend term,
with constant only and with both a constant and a time trend. Figure 4.6 plots the result of
this exercise. The response of government spending is highly persistent and does not show any
sign of returning to its steady state after 5 years in all the alternative specifications. This is
also the case for output response under the specifications with no trend. The specifications
with time trend generate identical median responses for most variables except for government
spending, suggesting the relative importance of including time trend that matches data moment
in VAR. Focusing on our variables of interests, the median responses of real exchange rate and
net exports are directly comparable under all specifications, but statistically insignificant under
specifications with no trend term. When the VAR model is estimated under the no-constant
no-trend assumptions, real exchange rate lies outside the 84th percentile of the baseline model,
while the response of net exports under the no-trend assumption lies outside the 84th percentile
of the baseline model. Overall, this analysis shows that our baseline model is relatively stable
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Figure 4.6: Sensitivity Analysis III: Alternative Model Specifications
Notes: See Figure 4.1. Solid lines depict baseline specification with a constant and a quadratic time trend,
starred lines display the specification with a constant and a linear time trend, dotted lines plot the specification
with only a constant, while dashed lines show the specification with no constant or time trend. The dotted-
dashed lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles for the baseline specification.
compared to other specifications and can generate reasonable impulse responses.
4.5 Conclusion
Motivated by the recent calls on the German government to increase its spending in order to
boost economic activities in the rest of the Euro countries, this paper examines the effect of such
fiscal expansion on German domestic demand for foreign goods and on foreign output. Using
Bayesian approach, we estimate a structural VAR model identified with Uhlig (2005)’s agnostic
identification method which imposes sign restrictions on the impulse response functions. The
imposed sign restrictions are derived from the predictions of standard business cycle models.
The model is estimated on quarterly time series data for Germany and 15 other European
countries (10 Euro and 5 non-Euro countries), including all the 14 EU countries analysed by
Beetsma & Giuliodori (2011).
The VAR estimation is carried out in two steps. First, we estimate an open-economy
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fiscal VAR model on six German variables (government spending, output, government debt,
real interest rate, real exchange rate, net exports) in order to estimate the effect of government
spending shock on demand for foreign goods. We identify a debt-financed government spending
shock which is defined as a shock that causes government spending, output and government
debt to move in the same direction in the first four quarters, including the impact period.
Evidence from this analysis shows that German government spending depreciates the domestic
real exchange rate and the terms of trade and deteriorates the trade balance. The deterioration
of the trade balance is driven by a sharp increase in the demand for imports, which rises much
faster than exports, suggesting some degrees of output spillover.
In the second step, we estimate the country-specific net effect of German spending spillovers
on European trading partners. To do this, we replace the external sector variables in the
baseline VAR model with foreign output and bilateral real exchange rate of each country.
Following Corsetti & Mu¨ller (2014), we control for the endogenous fiscal adjustments in foreign
economies by expressing German government spending in relative terms to partner’s spending.
Our results for this analysis show that an increase in German government spending leads to
output expansion on impact in non-GIIPS Euro countries, but have a non-positive impact
effect on output of GIIPS countries. Also, in non-GIIPS Euro countries, bilateral real exchange
rates initially appreciate in the short run to reflect the inflows of foreign exchange and then
depreciates in the medium run; whereas, in GIIPS countries, bilateral real exchange rates
mostly depreciate with about a year lag. The results for non-Euro countries are mixed and
significantly different across countries.
Given the policy implication of our analysis, expansion in German government spending
can improve economic activity in other Euro countries. However, the degree of integration
with the German economy, the extent of trade intensity and the internal dynamics (such as
the responsiveness of domestic prices or high sovereign debt risks as in the case of the GIIPS
countries) of foreign economies could influence the extent of gains from trade.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Motivated by the events of the last decade and recent debates in academic and policy circles
on the effectiveness of discretionary fiscal measures as macroeconomic stabilisation tools, this
thesis examines the domestic and international transmission of fiscal policy in Europe; taking
into consideration the degree of financial constraints among households in the economy, the
degree of country’s exposure to foreign fiscal shocks through the global asset market, and the
relative interdependence of fiscal policy in closely linked countries. The thesis comprises three
different but related papers.
The first paper examines the heterogeneous effects of UK fiscal policy on households given
the degree of financial constraints they face. The study finds that different types of households
respond distinctively to fiscal consolidation shocks, depending on the degree of financial con-
straints they face. The tightness of household’s financial constraints dampens the degree of
responsiveness of fiscal instruments to government debt, thereby prolonging the actualisation
of consolidation targets. The second paper investigates the international transmission of fiscal
policy shocks between the UK and the Euro area. The study finds that EA fiscal shocks have
sizeable effects on the UK economy, while UK fiscal shocks have negligible effects on the EA
economy, which we argue is partly driven by the relatively large size of UK trade with the EA,
and partly by the small size of the UK economy. Through analytical derivation and theoretical
simulation, the study further shows that the relative participation of countries at the global
asset market is a key driver of international fiscal spillovers. The third paper estimates the
country-specific spillover effects of an expansion in German government spending on output
and bilateral exchange rates of other European economies within a sign-restricted structural
VAR model. The results show that an expansion in German government spending has sizeable
but short-lived effects on foreign output. Responses of the Euro countries to German spending
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shock are homogeneous across subgroups of GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries, while non-Euro
countries exhibit substantial heterogeneity.
Given the policy implications of the analyses, fiscal authorities are encouraged to be cau-
tious in implementing consolidation plans in order to reduce the associated costs in terms of
output loss. One feasible suggestion is to selectively implement fiscal consolidation measures by
targeting specific sectors and consumer groups that are relatively indifferent to that measure
—for instance, cutting transfers to the Ricardian household. Regarding the international pol-
icy spillovers, fiscal authorities are encouraged to coordinate their policies in order to mitigate
against risks associated with cross-border transmission of fiscal policies. One of such risks is
evident in the analysis of German fiscal spillovers. The output spillover effects in the GIIPS
countries turn out to be negative, which is likely due to the high risk of default on sovereign
debts in those countries.
As in many other studies, the theoretical and empirical analyses reported in this thesis are
subject to several limitations and challenges that deserve to be mentioned. For instance, the
results of the theoretical models are silent on the impact of fiscal policy on nominal prices and
wages because nominal rigidities in goods or labour market are not incorporated in the models.
Also, in the analysis of the international fiscal spillovers between the UK and the EA, trade
with the rest of the world is not included. Whereas, the US and China are the single largest
trading partners of the EA and the UK, and extending the analysis to incorporate such large
trading partners may have substantial influence on the result of the model. Finally, the model
estimations are severely affected by the availability of quality data. In most cases, we are not
able to get quality data that matches the variables of interest at the appropriate frequency. In
cases where the data are available, they are either short —as evident in the short time series
used in the model estimation in the second and third papers— or have missing values.
The main chapters of this thesis can be extended or improved on in several ways. First, the
analysis reported in chapters 2 and 3 can be improved on by incorporating nominal rigidities
in goods and labour market. Future research may also consider incorporating monetary policy
and the financial sector in the theoretical model of fiscal policy. Specifically, studies have shown
that monetary policy can affect liquidity creation and therefore liquidity constraints. This, in
turn, could influence the effect of fiscal policy in both closed and open economies (for instance,
see Blanchard et al. (2016)). Also, incorporating the financial sector could help to account for
the impact of financial flows.
Future research may also want to re-evaluate the implication of household heterogeneity for
consolidation policy within a Heterogeneous Agents New Keynesian (HANK) model, as in Ka-
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plan et al. (2018). The HANK model features may also be combined with different regimes in
the state of the business cycle while analysing the effect of fiscal consolidation. It also possible
that different types of households have different utility preference.1 For instance, this might
be the case even among Ricardian families which smooth their consumption not only based on
expected income but also based on the uncertainty of their future income (that is, certainty
equivalence does not hold). Hence, future study may want to explore the implication of hetero-
geneity in utility preferences on household response to fiscal consolidation.2 Another suggestion
is to consider heterogeneity in household labour supply or heterogeneity in employment, where
low-skilled workers are employed by the informal sector while high-skilled workers are employed
in the formal sector. One could also consider incorporating search and matching frictions in
the labour market.
For chapter 4, the estimation of the country-specific fiscal spillovers could be improved with
the availability of long quarterly series on German government revenue, average marginal tax
or deficit-to-GDP ratio, since the new data series would provide valuable information about
the revenue side of the government budget. Incorporating data on sovereign debt risks or any
other proxy variable that could help to explain the heterogeneity in responses of GIIPS and
non-GIIPS countries to German spending shock would improve the paper to a great extent.
Also, as an alternative to the estimation strategy employed in this chapter, future research
may estimate the spillover effects of German government spending in a Global VAR with sign
restrictions, as in Eickmeier & Ng (2015), Feldkircher & Huber (2016) and Bettendorf & Leo´n-
Ledesma (2018).
1For instance, Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) show that the elasticity of substitution for asset holders and non-asset
holders differ considerably, irrespective of the measure of asset —stocks or bonds.
2In an earlier version of chapter 2, we model heterogeneity in household’s utility preference by allow-
ing differences in the risk aversion, Frisch labour elasticity and elasticity of substitution between pub-
lic and group-specific private consumption for Ricardian and rule-of-thumb households. However, we
are forced to abandon this feature due to non-availability to uniquely estimate each of the parame-
ters. See here: https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/business/events/
mmf-workshop/plenary/ILORI-Ayobami-Financial-Constraint.pdf
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